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THE HEAT IS ON: THERMOGRAMS AS 

EVIDENCE UNDER THE FRYE STANDARD 

ALAN R. GOODMAN* 

PATRICIA A. ZAK** 

I. INTRODUCTION 
Scientific evidence has come to play an increasingly important 
part in the presentation of cases. In criminal cases, scientific evidence 
has often replaced traditional methods of gathering evidence, such as 
interrogation and line-up identifications, which have given rise to 
fourth amendment concerns. I In civil cases, where these concerns are 
not present, attorneys may find that scientific evidence adds credibility 
to their cases and is even expected by technology-minded juries. 
This article will explore the applications of medical thermogra­
phy as scientific and demonstrative evidence in personal injury cases, 
with particular emphasis on overcoming the special challenges to ad­
missibility that thermography, as a relatively new procedure, may face 
in court. Medical thermography is a technique that translates surface 
skin temperature of a living body, as manifested by infrared radiation 
emitted by the superficial 5-6 mm. of skin, into a pictorial representa­
tion. 2 This "picture of heat" can be photographically captured, pro­
ducing a thermogram. 3 Abnormal heat patterns indicate causal 
pathology or injury,4 and provide objective evidence of pain which 
may not be otherwise clinically verified. 5 
* Partner, Matroni, Dimauro, Fitzgerald & Sweeney, Springfield, Massachusetts. 
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1. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States a 
Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1199-1200 (1980). 
2. H. REIN, THE PRIMER ON THERMOGRAPHY 15-1 (1983); Archer & Zinn, Ther­
mograms: Persuasive Tools in Soft-Tissue Injury Cases, TRIAL, Feb. 1983, at 68. 
3. Archer & Zinn, supra note 2, at 68. 
4. REIN, supra note 2, at 24-1; Archer & Zinn, supra note 2, at 68-69. For a detailed 
discussion, see infra notes 49-61 and accompanying text. 
5. Granelli, "Pictures of Pain" Pay Off, NAT'L L. J., Sept. 27, 1982 at 1, col. 1. 
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A. History and Development 
Hippocrates is credited with being the first medical practitioner to 
discover a relationship between irregular patterns of surface body tem­
perature and abnormality. He is said to have coated certain patients 
with a thin layer of mud which dried first where the underlying skin 
was hottest, such hot spots correlating with disease. 6 The physical 
principle which led to accurate measurement of surface temperature 
differentials was not revealed, however, until 1800, when infrared radi­
ation was discovered. 7 Subsequently, Sir John Hershel, son of the dis­
coverer of infrared radiation, produced the first "thermograph" 
around 1840 upon developing a process for imprinting the calorific 
rays of the solar spectrum on a specially prepared surface. 8 The rela­
tionship between heat and infrared radiation was further explored, 
particularly in the context of military applications, during the era of 
the World Wars.9 In the mid-1950's an engineering firm under con­
tract to the Army Corps of Engineers developed a high-resolution in­
frared scanner, which was the direct ancestor of the first medical 
infrared scanner exhibited in 1963.10 
Although the relationship between skin temperature and pathol­
ogy had long been recognized, II researchers were hampered by lack of 
technology that would adequately show surface temperature differen­
tials. 12 Studies in the 1920's and 1930's demonstrated that the skin of 
the human body emits measurable infrared radiation. \3 Thus, when 
Lawson suggested in 1956 that abnormalities in surface skin tempera­
ture provide a basis for the diagnosis of breast cancer,14 the stage was 
set for utilization of current infrared scanning techniques in clinical 
6. REIN, supra note 2, at 5-1. 
7. Id. 
8. Id.; See Taylor, Thermography, MASS. ACAD. OF TRIAL ATT'yS, DIAGNOSTIC 
MED. PROC. C-I, C-2 (1984). 
9. REIN, supra note 2, at 5-2; Taylor, supra note 8 at C-2. 
10. Taylor, supra note 8 at C-2. 
II. REIN, supra note 2, at 5-1; Taylor, supra note 8, at C-I, C-2. See Tichauer, The 
Objective Corroboration ofBack Pain through Thermography, 19 J. OCCUPATIONAL MED. 
727-28 (1977). 
12. Most attempts to assess skin temperature before medical thermography involved 
placing an instrument on the skin; this itself tended to alter skin temperature, and the 
process was also affected by the ambient temperature. Taylor, supra note 8, at C-2; Hen­
dler, Uematesu & Long, Thermographic Validation ofPhysical Complaints in "Psychogenic 
Pain" Patients, in REIN, supra note 2, at 26-1. 
13. Taylor, supra note 8, at C-2. 
14. Tichauer, supra note II, at 727 n.3 (citing Lawson, Implications ofSurface Tem­
perature in the Diagnosis ofBreast Cancer, 75 CAN. MED. Assoc. J. 309 (1956». 
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medicine. 15 
Medical thermography has been used for over two decades to de­
tect, study, and monitor the treatment of various conditions, including 
breast cancer, tumors, and vascular disease. 16 More importantly for 
the personal injury case, thermography has been applied in recent 
years to evaluate and monitor pain-producing conditions such as 
whiplash injuries, sprains, low back (lumbar) disk abnormalities, sen­
sory nerve involvement, and soft tissue injuries generally.17 Within 
the last ten years, thermographic studies performed on patients with 
back pain have linked abnormal spinal thermograms with apparently 
related manifestations in other parts of the body. IS Most recently, 
thermography has been used to corroborate subjective complaints of 
pain where other objective evidence was absent.19 
B. Test Technique and Equipment 
Thermographic measurement is based on the physics of infrared 
radiation. A body whose temperature is above absolute zero emits in­
frared radiation.2o Infrared is part of the electromagnetic spectrum, 
15. Tichauer, supra note 11, at 727. During the 1960's scanning thermography was 
touted as a method for detection of breast cancer. See Edeiken, Wallace, Curley & Lee, 
Thermography and Herniated Lumbar Disks, 102 AM. J. ROENTGENOLOGY, RADIUM 
THERAPY NUCLEAR MED. 790 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Edeiken]; Granelli, supra note 
5, at 23, col. 2. Other techniques, particularly mammography, proved to be much more 
accurate, however; some commentators feel that the resultant "bad press" set back the 
acceptance and further development of thermography. Granelli, supra note 5, at 23, col. 2. 
Nevertheless, when used in conjunction with other diagnostic techniques, thermography 
still appears to be recognized as a useful tool in breast cancer detection. See, e.g., Tieman 
v. Heinzen, 104 A.D.2d 645, 647, 480 N.Y.S.2d 24, 26 (N.Y.App. Div. 1984); Jones v. 
Montfiore Hosp., 494 Pa. 410, 418, 431 A.2d 920, 924 (1981); Johnson v. Misericordia 
Community Hosp., 99 Wis.2d 708, 724, 301 N.W.2d 156, 164 (1981). 
16. Christiansen, Thermographic Physiology, REIN, supra note 2, at 7-\. See also 
Edeiken, supra note 15, at 790; Potanin, Hunt & Sheffield, Thermographic Patterns ofAn­
gina Pectoris, 42 CIRCULATION 199 (1970). 
17. Fisher, Thermography in Evaluation of Chronic Pain, Disability and Preemploy­
ment Status, REIN, supra note 2, at 22-2; Edeiken, supra note 15; Raskin, Martinez-Lopez 
& Sheldon, Lumbar Thermography in Discogenic Disease, 119 RADIOLOGY 149 (1976); See 
generally Tichauer, supra note I\, 
18. Tichauer, supra note 11, at 730 (most patients in pain had abnormal spinal ther­
mograms, often with abnormal gluteal "cold spots" as well); Ching & Wexler, Peripheral 
Thermographic Manifestations of Lumbar-Disk Disease, 7 ApPLIED RADIOLOGY 53, 56 
(1978) (temperature changes in lower extremities correlated with abnormalities in particu­
lar lumbar discs). See infra text accompanying note 55 for more detailed explanation. 
19. Hendler, Uematesu & Long, supra note 12 at 26-1; Wexler, Lumbar, Thoracic, 
and Cervical Thermography, 1 J. NEUROLOGY & ORTHOPEDIC SURGERY 37, 39 (1979); 
Tichauer, supra note 11, at 730. See infra text accompanying note 1O\. 
20. Tichauer, supra note 11, at 727. Absolute zero is -273°C, the temperature al 
which all molecular motion stops. 
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which includes visible light; infrared is of a lower frequency and longer 
wavelength than visible light. 21 
The wavelength emitted by a point on an object is a function of 
temperature; as the temperature of the point increases, the wavelength 
of the emitted radiation shortens. The human body gives off wave­
length of infrared within a certain known range; therefore, in order to 
detect temperatures in the human body range, a material sensitive to 
wavelengths in that range is used as a sensor.22 Each of the two meth­
ods of thermographic measurement depends on this fact. 
Electronic thermography is accomplished by means of infrared 
scanning. Rapidly rotating mirrors scan the body surface and direct 
the emitted radiation to an infrared sensor, which collects this "infor­
mation" and converts it into electronic signals. These signals are 
processed into black-and-white or color signals and projected onto a 
television monitor viewed by the examiner. 23 The images can be pre­
served by mounting an ordinary 35 mm or Polaroid camera or video 
recorder on the machine.24 
In color electronic thermography, the operator controls the color 
sequence and can change it as he desires. 25 For this reason, a color 
scale appears in each picture, showing the colors for that image in 
order from the one representing the hottest temperature to that repre­
senting the coldest. The actual colors have no intrinsic meaning; red 
tones, for example, do not necessarily mean "hot."26 The operator 
also selects the "window" or temperature range that the machine will 
view.27 By doing so, he sets the sensitivity of the color scale. For 
instance, on a machine with ten color bands, each color would repre­
21. Alban, The Basic Physics ofClinical Thermography, in REIN, supra note 2, at 6-1. 
22. Id. at 6-2. 
23. REIN, supra note 2, at 19-1. 
24. Id.; INFRAMETRICS, THE FORENSIC SPECIAL I. 
25. REIN, supra note 2, at 19-1; Wexler, Diagnosing Spinal Problems with Thermo­
graphy, DIAGNOSTIC IMAGING, March 1981, at 28. 
26. Wexler, supra note 25, at 28. 
27. An electronic scanner may have a temperature measurement range of -30oe to 
230°C. Most of this potential is useless in measuring emissions from the human body. The 
operator may select a viewing window of lOoe - the window can be adjusted up or down 
to accommodate individual idiosyncracies. The lOoe range is adequate to show significant 
temperature differences. See infra text accompanying notes 69-86. The operator will select 
a window such that the background to the image (i.e., the room in which the thermography 
is performed, whose temperature is controlled, see infra notes 63-65 and accompanying 
text) is outside the viewing range and is imaged as black. Selection is not made on the basis 
of the patient's skin temperature per se (which is irrelevant because it is differences in 
temperature, not degrees of heat, which are significant, see infra notes 49-50 and accompa­
nying text) but rather is aimed at blacking out the background and obtaining maximum 
contrast in significant body areas. 
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sent ten percent of the total temperature range being viewed. A view­
ing window of WOC means that each color would represent a l°C 
difference from its immediate neighbors on the color scale.28 
In black and white electronic thermography,29 a calibrated gray 
scale is built in, leaving the operator only the option of showing "hot" 
as either bright or dark.30 Temperature differences are indicated by a 
continuous scale of gray tones rather than by colors.31 
The other method of thermographic measurement, known as con­
tact or liquid crystal thermography (LCT), depends on the sensitivity 
of certain cholesterol derivative crystals that selectively reflect infrared 
light in a narrow range of wavelengths.32 Each type of crystal used 
has a specific color response to wavelength temperatures that are emit­
ted from the human body.33 
The apparatus used in contact thermography consists of a sealed 
box, one side of which is a flexible, transparent sheath in which sensi­
tive crystals are embedded. The remaining sides of the box are rigid, 
transparent plastic frames. 34 Air pumped into the box allows the 
sheath side to function as an air pillow, which is placed directly on the 
subject and contours itself to the subject's body.35 
A number of LCT boxes are available, each with a slightly differ­
ent temperature range. This allows the operator to select the box with 
the widest display for the subject's skin temperature. The operator 
initially uses a box with a median Celsius temperature range of 300 If• 
"cold" colors predominate, the skin temperature is too cold for that 
range, and a 28 0 box must then be used for a wider color display.36 
This procedure is analogous to the selection of a viewing window in 
electronic thermography. In contact thermography, the color scale 
and its sensitivity are fixed by the chemical composition of the crys­
tals, and thus are not controlled by the operatorY The subject's body 
28. Wexler, supra note 25, at 28; INFRAMETRICS, supra note 24, at 1. 
29. Black and white is preferred for certain purposes, see infra note 83. 
30. INFRAMETRICS, supra note 24, at 1-4. 
31. Id. at 1-8. 
32. REIN, supra note 2, at 19-1; Pochaczevsky, Wexler, Meyers, Epstein & Marc, 
Liquid Crystal Thermography of the Spine and Extremities, 56 J. NEUROSURGERY 386 
(1982) [hereinafter cited as Pochaczevsky]. 
33. Pochaczevsky, supra note 32, at 386. 
34. Id. at 387. 
35. Id. This apparatus replaced earlier contact methods, which involved painting the 
crystals directly onto the skin, or using rigid plates impregnated with crystals. The former 
method yielded unreliable results, while the latter did not contour well to the body. Taylor, 
supra note 8, at C-4. 
36. Pochaczevsky, supra note 32, at 387. 
37. Wexler, supra note 25, at 28. The LCT color scale, from coldest to hottest, be­
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heat causes a color image to appear on the liquid crystal sheath, and 
the image is immediately photographed.38 These two methods of ther­
mography, electronic and contact, correlate well as both are essen­
tially performing the same function. 39 
C. Thermography's Unique Value in Personal Injury Cases 
Thermography can be of particular value in personal lllJury 
claims. Not only are thermo grams dramatic and graphic illustrations 
of injury, but thermography provides objective evidence of otherwise 
unexplained pain. Thermography can document soft tissue injuries 
such as sprains, whiplash injuries, and low back sprains which are not 
revealed by other diagnostic methods.40 It is a completely objective 
method to document trigger points and resulting areas of referred pain 
(termed myofascial pain syndrome).41 It is also the only objective test 
capable of identifying sensory nerve damage, which can cause pain in 
areas other than the immediate locus of the affected nerve root.42 
Thermography can detect and demonstrate organic disorders that 
gins with dark brown and progresses through light brown, red brown, yellow, green, light 
blue, and dark blue (hottest), in that order. Wexler, supra note 25, at 28. An example of 
color range sensitivity calibrations in one LCT box is as follows: Dark brown, 32°C; light 
brown, 32.3°C; red brown, 32.7°C; yellow, 33.6°C; green, 33.7°C; light blue, 34.6°C; and 
dark blue, 36°C. Pochaczevsky, supra note 32, at 389. 
38. Pochaczevsky, supra note 32, at 388. 
39. Taylor, supra note 8, at C-4. See C. WEXLER, AN OVERVIEW OF LIQUID CRYS­
TAL AND ELECTRONIC LUMBAR, THORACIC, AND CERVICAL THERMOGRAPHY (1981), 
where results of LCT and electronic thermography are used interchangeably. See also 
Pochaczevsky, supra note 32, at 392. 
40. Fisher, supra note 17, at 22-2. 
41. Id. A "trigger point" is an area within traumatized muscle tissue that is capable 
of referring pain to otherwise normal tissue which is anatomically distinct from the source 
of the initial trauma. A trigger point may be "silent," that is, display no clinically detecta­
ble abnormality, yet still be capable of referring pain to otherwise normal structures when 
stimulated. The pain associated with such trigger points is termed myofascial pain, and it 
probably accounts for a significant percentage of undiagnosed, misdiagnosed and "unman­
ageable" pain complaints. A typical example is whiplash, where cervical (neck) trauma 
may be followed by referred pain in the hand, arm, jaw, or face. Flashner & Maher, Cervi­
cal Trauma, in MASS. ACAD. OF TRIAL ATT'YS DIAGNOSTIC MED. PROC., at A-2, A-3. 
The painful areas show no local pathology and have normal function. Fisher, supra note 
17, at 22-3. 
42. C. Wexler and R. Small, Thermographic Demonstration ofa Sensory Nerve Defi­
cit: A Case Report, 3 J. NEUROLOGICAL ORTHOPEDIC SURGERY (April, 1981); Wexler, 
Thermographic Evaluation of Trauma, 5 ACTA THERMOGRAPHICA 3, 9 (1980); Rein, Ther­
mography and the Chiropractor, THE AMERICAN CHIROPRACTOR, July/August 1983, at 
46. But see Goodley, Thermography, 249 J. A.M.A. 1003, 1004 (1983) (questioning 
whether an abnormal thermogram distinctly shows sensory nerve damage, and maintaining 
that disruption of the vascular flow by means of sympathetic nerve damage is sufficient 
explanation of thermographic findings). See infra text accompanying notes 51-55 for 
discussion. 
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might otherwise be, and often are, dismissed as psychogenic pain, the 
product of the complainant's imagination.43 
II. SCIENTIFIC FOUNDATIONS AND PRINCIPLES OF 

THERMOGRAPHY 

A. Physiological Basis 
Heat is a byproduct of body metabolism, and is distributed 
throughout the body by the vascular and lymphatic systems, to be ulti­
mately conveyed to the skin and lost through convection and radia­
tion.44 One mechanism regulating surface heat loss and therefore 
controlling surface skin temperature is the constriction and dilation of 
the capillaries forming the vascular net that lies just beneath the 
skin.45 When these capillaries are dilated, they allow increased blood 
flow in the capillaries and increased perfusion of blood in surrounding 
tissues, resulting in a quantitative increase in the temperature of the 
overlying skin.46 Conversely, constriction of the surface capillaries de­
creases the vascular supply to the affected area and lowers skin tem­
perature.47 It is these temperature variations that are detected by 
thermography in the form of radiant heat emission.48 
Normally, the human body emits heat in symmetrical patterns; 
any variation from symmetry indicates abnormality and possible 
causal problems.49 Thermography reveals the presence or absence of 
such variations; a thermogram thus reveals the function, rather than 
the anatomical structure, of the body.5o 
The mechanisms responsible for alterations in surface blood sup­
ply are not completely understood, but various theories have been pos­
43. Hendler, Uematesu & Long, supra note 12, at 26-\. 
44. Archer & Zinn, supra note 2, at 68; Christiansen, supra note 16, at 7-2. 
45. Archer & Zinn, supra note 2, at 69; Christiansen, supra note 16, at 7-2. 
46. Archer & Zinn, supra note 2, at 69; Christiansen, supra note 16, at 7-2. 
47. Archer & Zinn, supra note 2, at 69, Christiansen, supra note 16, at 7-2. 
48. Christiansen, supra note 16, at 7-3. While some studies have suggested that tu­
mors or hyperactive muscles (i.e. muscles in spasm) act as thermographically detectable 
heat sources, these claims have been questioned; it appears that abnormal heat generated by 
such sources is probably so rapidly dissipated as to have little effect on the temperature of 
surrounding tissue. [d. at 7-1 to 7-3. 
49. LeRoy, Christian & Filasky, The Role of Thermography in Diagnosis and Man­
agement of Chronic Pain, 4 MEDIGUIDE TO PAIN I, 1-2 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Le­
Roy]; REIN, supra note 2, at 24-1; see also Pochaczevsky, supra note 32, at 388-91; 
Tichauer, supra note II, at 730; Wexler, supra note 25, at 26. 
50. REIN, supra note 2, at 15-2; Meyer & Meyers, Would You Like to Know What 
Pain Looks Like? 28 LA. BAR J. 77, 77-78 (1980). Other diagnostic procedures, such as 
myelography and the CAT scan, present two-dimensional pictures of anatomical struc­
tures. REIN, supra note 2, at 15-16. 
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tulated. "Cold spots," caused by vasoconstriction in the affected area, 
may be the result of noxious stimuli on nerve roots of the sympathetic 
nervous system where they exit the spine.51 Such stimuli include irri­
tation, scarring of the nerve root, and pressure on the root. 52 Nerve 
fibers disrupted by injury may reunify incorrectly during healing so 
that they transmit crossed or mixed messages. 53 The sympathetic ner­
vous system responds to stimuli in a certain way; the classic sympa­
thetic reaction to stress stimuli includes "fight-or-flight" responses 
such as pupil dilation, increased blood flow to skeletal and heart mus­
cle, and vasoconstriction in the digestive tract and skin. 54 Where 
nerve root irritation exists, affected sympathetic nerves remain stimu­
lated and vasoconstriction persists in areas of the body surface ener­
vated by those nerves, producing the cool spots imaged by 
thermography. This process, which is associated with pain, may per­
sist after the original causal injury has apparently healed. 55 
Thermographically-shown "hot spots" have engendered various 
physiological explanations. The vasodilation that produces abnor­
mally warm areas has been attributed to metabolic changes within cer­
tain cells, such as changes produced by tumors,56 and to muscle spasm 
caused by irritation of the motor nerves mediating the affected area. 57 
Both of these suggestions have been criticized. 58 Another theory pos­
tulates the release of a substance that acts as a vasodilator and pro­
duces pain when sensory nerves are stimulated.59 The affected 
51. Wexler, supra note 19, at 39; Pochaczvesky, supra note 32, at 389; Christiansen, 
supra note 16, at 7-4, 7-5. The sympathetic nerves are part of the autonomic nervous sys­
tem, which controls involuntary body mechanisms. 
52. Wexler, supra note 19, at 39. Pressure or compression of nerve roots can be 
caused by a herniated disc, lumbar-disc disease and abnormality generally, and any dis­
placement of discs or the bony structures of the spine, see Ching & Wexler, supra note 18, 
at 56, as well as by inflammation of surrounding tissues. Archer & Zinn, supra note 2, at 
69. 
53. Wexler, supra note 19, at 39. 
54. W. KEETON, BIOLOGICAL SCIENCE 334,372 (1967); REIN, supra note 2, at 24-2. 
55. REIN, supra note 2, at 24-2; LeRoy, supra note 49, at 2; Pochaczevsky, supra 
note 32, at 389; Ching & Wexler, supra note 18, at 53. Wexler further suggests that the 
small surface vessels affected by the particular nerve root are put into spasm by the excess 
stimulation of the irritated nerve. Wexler, supra note 19, at 39. Tichauer speculated that 
muscle spasm might cause certain "cold patches," but this theory does not seem to have 
been pursued. Tichauer, supra note II, at 730. But see C. WEXLER, AN OVERVIEW OF 
LIQUID CRYSTAL AND ELECTRONIC LUMBAR, THORACIC, & CERVICAL THERMOGRAPHY 
26 (1981). See also 23 AM. JUR. ProofofFacts 2d 11-12 (1980) (mechanisms of reflex pain 
are not well defined). 
56. Pochaczevsky, supra note 32, at 389; Christiansen, supra note 16, at 7·1 to 7-3. 
57. Wexler, supra note 19, at 39. 
58. See supra note 48. 
59. Christiansen, supra note 16, at 7-4. 
21 1986] THERMOGRAMS 
individual may experience referred pain with abnormal skin tempera­
ture at some distance from the source of the dysfunction.60 
Because the importance of thermography lies in its ability to ob­
jectively pinpoint physiological dysfunction, rather than in revelation 
of the anatomical source of the underlying problem,61 the uncertainty 
regarding the precise mechanism producing variations in skin temper­
ature does not affect the validity of thermography. 
B. Procedure and Protocol 
1. Test protocol. Those who have sought to establish medical 
thermography as a diagnostic tool have recognized the importance of 
standardizing test procedure so as to obtain reproducible results. Re­
producible results are necessary to establish the reliability and accu­
racy of the technique. 62 
Test procedure is designed to eliminate artifacts. The examina­
tion room is temperature controlled and draft-free.63 The subject 
spends 10-20 minutes in this or a similarly-controlled room to allow 
stabilization of skin temperature, a process called equilibration.64 The 
imaging process is repeated three times, with 10-20 minute intervals 
for re-equilibration. An abnormality that is consistently evidenced 
over this time period reliably indicates physiological damage.65 
Approved protocol includes taking a predetermined sequence of 
images within a limited time, with the subject positioned so that corre­
sponding left and right parts of the body are imaged, if not on the 
same view, as close in time as possible.66 For example, where the sub­
ject's history suggests lower back spinal nerve root involvement, a se­
quence might include views of the lumbar region, buttocks, both 
thighs, lower legs, ankles and feet. Such a sequence will reveal any 
spinal abnormalities and related manifestations in the extremities, and 
60. See REIN, supra note 2, at 24-1; see supra note 41 for a discussion of trigger 
points and myofascial pain syndrome; see also Potanin, Hunt & Sheffield, supra note 16, at 
204. 
61. REIN supra note 2, at 15-2. 
62. See Pochaczevsky, supra note 32, at 387-88; Wexler, supra note 19, at 37; REIN, 
supra note 2, at 17-1 to 17-2; Ching & Wexler, supra note 18, at 53. 
63. Actual temperature is less important than stability of temperature. REIN, supra 
note 2, at 17-1. 
64. Id. Some thermographers have also forced skin cooling by sponging areas to be 
imaged with water. WEXLER, supra note 39, at Afterword; Pochaczevsky, supra note 32, at 
387. 
65. WEXLER, supra note 39 at 30; Wexler, supra note 19, at 37; Pochaczevsky, supra 
note 32, at 388. See REIN, supra note 2, at 17-1 to 17-2. 
66. REIN, supra note 2, at 27-1; WEXLER, supra note 39, at Afterword. 
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allow side-by-side comparison for symmetry.67 Each image taken 
photographically or by videotape should be labelled as to time and 
date taken and subject. 68 
2. Interpretation. In thermography, the subject is his own norm 
and control; the colors of the image and the actual skin temperature 
have no particular significance, nor do color/temperature variations 
from one area to another, unless the patterns thus formed lack symme­
try.69 Consistent absence of symmetry always has a physiological 
meaning, whether asymmetrical areas are hyperthermic ("hot spots") 
or hypothermic ("cold spots").70 Interpretation of thermograms is 
based on comparison of thermographic images of the subject, either of 
left- and right-side images, or of baseline and subsequent images.71 
While thermography demonstrates physiological abnormality of 
function, it does not describe anatomical structure: a thermogram 
cannot indicate when a problem began, or reveal the anatomical cause 
of an abnormality. Nor does a thermogram "show" pain.72 Instead, it 
provides a basis for diagnosis when interpreted in conjunction with a 
subject's clinical history and complaints, and sometimes with comple­
mentary diagnostic techniques, thereby providing objective evidence of 
67. Pochaczevsky, supra note 32, at 388; Ching & Wexler, supra note 18, at 53. See 
infra notes 74·80 and accompanying text. 
68. Such labelling would allow thermograms to be authenticated in court in the same 
manner as x·rays. Rein, Proving Soft Tissue Injuries in Court, BELLI L.J., Winter 1984,8, 
14-15. But see Frias v. Valle, - Nev. -, -, 698 P.2d 875, 877 (1985) (thermograms not 
adequately authenticated when no one with personal knowledge (i.e., the thermographer) 
testified as to how, when, and in what manner the thermographic sequence was performed, 
although thermograms were labelled with subject's name; admission was error). Further, 
exact time and date information is vital to validate any interpretation based on thermo­
grams since, to be reliable, a sequence should be completed as rapidly as possible, and to be 
significant, findings must appear consistently in more than one sequence. WEXLER, supra 
note 39, at 30. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
69. REIN, supra note 2, at 32-1; LeRoy, supra note 49, at 1-2; text accompanying 
notes 6-19. 
70. Pochaczevsky, supra note 32, at 388-89. The only exception is an increase in 
temperature occasionally noted in the dominant arm of very muscular men. Id. at 389. 
Significant thermographic findings may not always be indicative of current pain or dysfunc­
tion; they may show sites of old, healed trauma, Ching & Wexler, supra note 18, at 58, and 
are sensitive enough to show abnormalities in individuals who suffer only intermittent, 
"clinically subliminal" pain, Wexler, supra note 19, at 39, or who are asymptomatic. 
Archer & Zinn, supra note 2, at 69. 
71. See supra notes 49 and 50 and accompanying text. "Baseline" thermograms, in 
most cases, are those taken of patients with clinical complaints before surgery or treatment; 
these are compared with thermograms taken postoperatively or during and after treatment 
to monitor the patient's progress. See LeRoy, supra note 49, at 3-5. In the case of the 
spine, there is a known "normal" pattern of heat emission which provides a baseline com­
parison. See infra text accompanying note 76. 
72. LeRoy, supra note 49, at 5. 
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pain-causing conditions.73 Depending on the history and subjective 
complaints presented, the thermographer can expect certain thermo­
graphic patterns. 
Where spinal nerve root involvement is present or suspected,74 
the thermographer studies images of the spinal area and the extremi­
ties. 75 A "normal" spine presents a known thermographic image: a 
warm stripe overlaying the spine from the neck to the lower lumbar 
area, widening somewhat in the lower thoracic and upper lumbar area, 
then tapering and ending at the fourth or fifth lumbar vertebrae; warm 
oval areas corresponding to the sacroiliac joints slightly below and to 
either side of the lower end of the spinal warm stripe; and a warm area 
over the cleft of the buttocks.76 Nerve root involvement in the lumbo­
sacral area, or lower back, usually appears as a hyperthermic area 
overlaying muscles adjacent to the affected nerve root; in the 
cervicothoracic, or upper back, nerve root involvement tends to result 
in hypothermia of adjacent muscle areas. 77 In addition to the spinal 
findings, the thermographer wi11look for zones of hypothermia ("cold 
spots") in the extremities along the dermatomes, areas of skin which 
are affected by the damaged nerve root.78 Known, distinctive patterns 
appear in most cases of spinal nerve root involvement,79 and such 
nerve root involvement often accounts for persistent pain after an ap­
parently unrelated back injury.80 
73. Ching & Wexler, supra note 18, at 56, 58. 
74. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
75. Ching & Wexler, supra note 18, at 53, 58. 
76. Edeiken, supra note 15, at 790-91; Raskin, Martinez-Lopez & Sheldon, supra 
note 17, at 149. The human spine contains 26 separate vertebrae. In order from the neck 
to the base of the spine, they consist of seven cervical, 12 thoracic, five lumbar, the sacral 
and the coccygeal vertebrae. Goodman, Diagnostic Medical Procedures in Personal Injury 
- Soft Tissue Injuries, in MASS. ACAD. OF TRIAL A IT'yS, DIAGNOSTIC MED. PROC. at D­
15 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Goodman]. 
77. Pochaczevsky, supra note 32, at 389-90. 
78. Id. at 388-89. Occasionally (about ten percent of the time, according to REIN, 
supra note 2, at 32-2), particularly in the hands and feet, "hot spots," or hyperthermia, 
along the affected dermatome occurs instead. Pochaczevsky, supra note 32, at 389. 
A dermatome is an area of skin innervated by a specific nerve. Dermatomes are envi­
sioned as extending from the area over the spine where the nerve exits the spine in long, 
narrow strips; for example, the L5 dermatome extends from the 5th lumbar vertebra down 
the outside of the thigh and leg to the first through fourth toes. Goodman, supra note 76, 
at D-20. The preferred diagram of dermatomes, among the number that exist, each with 
slight variations, is published in Keegan & Garrett, The Segmental Distribution o/the Cuta­
neous Nerves in the Limbs 0/ Man, 102 ANAT. REC. 411 (1948). 
79. See Pochaczevsky, supra note 32, at 393; REIN, supra note 2, at 32-6; but cf 
Edeiken, supra note 15, at 791 (cervical spine nerve root involvement may create unclear, 
badly defined peripheral manifestations in the neck and upper back). 
80. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
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For a thermographic finding to be considered significant alone, 
thermograms must show two areas with a minimum of"1 °C difference 
affecting at least 25% of the surface area of the affected dermatome 
when compared to the opposite view." Usually this calls for a "hot" 
or "cold" area on the spine, with a cold area in the extremities.sl 
Other types of spinal damage, including musculoligamentous spi­
nal injuries and osseous lesion (bony structure abnormalities) without 
nerve root involvement, seem to cause skin temperature changes in the 
immediate area of the spine, without changes in the extremities. 82 The 
thermographer will interpret the image in light of the known "nor­
mal" spine pattern of heat emissions.83 
Local trauma has a local effect and may also show as skin pat­
terns related to the unique anatomy of the site of the injury, such as 
the areas of referred pain associated with trigger points. 84 Certain 
pathologies, such as vascular diseases and joint abnormalities, will be 
imaged as particular patterns.85 
When interpreting any thermogram, note that thermographic ab­
normalities may change over time. Generally, the early phases are 
characterized by hyperthermia, which is often followed by hy­
pothermia as the condition becomes chronic. 86 
81. Wexler, supra note 25, at 28; REIN, supra note 2, at 32-6; Hendler, Uematesu & 
Long, supra note 12, at 26-2. Less-than-cIassical thermographic findings may be significant 
in individual cases, however. WEXLER, supra note 39, at 30. Some commentators have 
noted that color differences may appear more significant than they are when viewed at the 
1.0 level (i.e., where the viewing window of the equipment is set so that each color repre­
sents a I·C difference from its immediate neighbors on the color scale, see supra text ac­
companying notes 25-28); where two colors meet on the thermogram, the temperature 
difference may be less than I·e. If this raises questions as to the significance of the find­
ings, it may be appropriate to lower the viewing level to .5 or even .2. Dudley, Peripheral 
Nerve Loss Seen by Thermography, 21 J. OF CHIROPRACTIC 63 (1984); see Granelli, supra 
note 5, at 22. 
82. Pochaczevsky, supra note 32, at 390. 
83. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text. Black and white thermograms are 
preferred for spinal imaging, as the interpretor is looking for a particular qualitative pattern 
or its absence (unlike other areas of thermography, where quantatative images are vital to 
the significance of findings, see supra note 81 and accompanying text), and black and white 
more adequately visualizes the spinal pattern, WEXLER, supra note 39 at Addendum, 
whereas "hot spots" may be very small and often linear. Christiansen, supra note 16, at 7­
3. 
84. See supra note 41; REIN, supra note 2 at 32-2. 
85. See REIN, supra note 2, at 32-2, 32-3; Potanin, Hunt & Sheffield, supra note 16, 
at 203-04. 
86. Hendler, Uematesu & Long, supra note 12, at 26-7; REIN, supra note 2, at 32-3. 
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III. VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY OF THERMOGRAPHY 
A. Validity 
Since the 1960's, when thermography was first used to diagnose 
lumbar disk disease, the sensitivity and reliability of thermographic 
equipment has significantly increased, with a proportionate increase in 
the reliability of the technique.87 Thermography's validity, the proce­
dure's ability to show what it purports to show, has been established 
through clinical and surgical confirmation of thermographic diagno­
ses, and by comparisons with the accuracy of accepted diagnostic tech­
niques, particularly myelography and electromyography.88 
In 1967, Edeiken presented a study of 26 patients with surgically 
proven abnormal lumbar discs; both thermography and myelography 
were predictive in 80% of the cases. 89 In 1976, Raskin reported that, 
for 38 patients with surgically confirmed abnormal lumbar discs, ther­
mograms were predictive 71 % of the time, while myelograms were 
correct for 88% of the cases.90 By studying thermograms of the lower 
extremities in conjunction with lumbar thermograms, Wexler has 
found the thermogram to be an accurate predictor of lumbar abnor­
mality in 92% of 51 cases of lumbar complaints confirmed by objec­
tive clinical findings. 91 In the same study, reported in 1979, the 
electromyogram (EMG) demonstrated overall accuracy of 86%.92 In 
a hospital study of 101 patients who had objective clinical findings of 
abnormalities of the back and extremities, and 61 patients who under­
went both myelograms and thermographic studies of the back and ex­
tremities, myelographic and thermographic findings agreed in 84% of 
the cases.93 Thermography demonstrated a higher correlation with 
the clinical findings, however, with a 79% positive rate; myelograms 
were positive in only 62% of the cases.94 Thirty-eight patients had 
surgery, myelography, and thermography: the overall accuracy of 
thermography, surgically confirmed, was 95%, while that of mye­
87. Archer & Zinn, supra note 2, at 69; Edeiken, supra note IS, at 792. 
88. See infra text accompanying notes 89-97. Electromyography records muscle ac­
tivity by means of electrodes inserted into soft tissue; it is used in the diagnosis of peripheral 
nerve lesions. Myelography, a procedure in which the spine is injected with contrast dye 
and x-rayed, is used to detect ruptured discs. Goodman, supra note 76, at 0-5, 0-6. 
89. Edeiken, supra note IS, at 792. 
90. Raskin, Martinez-Lopez & Sheldon, supra note 17, at lSI. 
91. Wexler, supra note 19, at 40. 
92. Id. See also WEXLER, supra note 39, at 34 (findings confirmed in study of 130 
patients). 
93. Pochaczevsky, supra note 32, at 392. 
94. Id. 
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lography was 84%.95 
In another recent study of 100 patients with clinical findings con­
sistent with low back pain, thermography gave positive results in 94% 
of the cases, while CAT scans96 yielded positive findings only 64% of 
the time.97 Using the relatively primitive technique of painting ther­
mographic liquid crystals directly onto the subjects' skin,98 researchers 
at Brook Army Medical Center found that tenderness to palpation was 
associated with thermographically shown elevated skin temperatures 
in 80% of 62 patients hospitalized for low-back pain.99 In the same 
study, positive thermographic findings correlated well with radio­
graphic findings. 100 Researchers at John Hopkins Hospital performed 
thermographic evaluations of 224 patients complaining of chronic 
pain, who had been diagnosed as having only psychogenic pain with 
no physical cause. They found that 43 of these individuals (19%) had 
abnormal thermograms indicating nerve root involvement, previously 
undiagnosed. \01 
B. Reliability 
Test reliability relates to a procedure's consistency over time, in 
that the same results are obtained when the test is repeated. Thermog­
raphers have addressed potential reliability problems via their concern 
with establishing and maintaining appropriate test procedure and pro­
tocol. \02 Proponents/practitioners of thermography assert that its re­
liability is sufficiently guaranteed when the recommended procedures 
are conscientiously followed. \03 
The reliability and overall usefulness of thermography have been 
questioned, however, and the technique is not accepted by all members 
95. Id. 
96. A technique in which x-rays are taken and are then interpreted by computer so 
as to allow a nondistorted view of a cross-section of the spine. It is now used in evaluation 
of ruptured discs. Goodman, supra note 76, at D-5 to D-6. 
97. LeRoy, supra note 49, at 3. 
98. See supra note 35. 
99. Rubal, Traycoff, and Ewing, Liquid Crystal Thermography: A New Tool for 
Evaluating Low Back Pain, 62 PHYSICAL THERAPY 1593, 1596 (1982). 
100. Id. 

1O\. Hendler, Uematesu & Long, supra note 12, at 26-\. 

102. See supra notes 62-68 and accompanying text. 
103. See, e.g., Granelli, supra note 5, at 22, col. 4 and 23, col. 1 (quoting Wexler's 
statement that "If a person is injured, it'll show up the same way consistently . . . . we 
take a number of pictures over time [under controlled conditions] to ensure accuracy."); 
Rein, supra note 2, at 17-1 to 17-2. See Ferlise v. Eiler, 202 N.J. Super. 330, 335, 495 A.2d 
129, 131 (1985), where the plaintitrs failure to offer foundation evidence on procedure and 
protocol was among the reasons for upholding the exclusion of thermograms. 
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of the medical profession. I04 Some of the resistance is probably due to 
a measure of conservatism and to the newness of thermographic appli ­
cations in soft-tissue injuries.105 Specific criticisms include the thin­
ness of the data base in this area; few statistical studies exist.106 The 
relative scarcity of trained and experienced thermographers is another 
problem. 107 The failure, as yet, to establish "normal" thermographic 
patterns that take into account factors of age, sex, and body weight, 
sometimes claimed to affect heat patterns,108 has troubled commenta­
tors.109 One practitioner strikes a cautionary note: 
[Thermography] can show the immediate influence of sympathetic 
activity on vascular flow in various conditions, but it does not de­
clare the culprit. Although it is an invaluable other "eye," it is no 
substitute brain and must be interpreted in the context with clinical 
examination . . . . The thermogram does not displace the skilled 
clinician, and our ability to integrate this new information' is too 
undeveloped to overstate its value uncritically. \10 
IV. ADMISSIBILITY OF "NOVEL" SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE 
FR YE STANDARD 
A. The Frye Standard 
In 1923, a defendant convicted of murder appealed to the District 
of Columbia Court of Appeals, III alleging as error the trial court's 
refusal to admit expert testimony on the results of a "deception test," a 
104. See Granelli, supra note 5, at 22, co\. 2 ("Test is premature"). One proponant 
suggests that the resistance to thermography is related to an over-reliance on instrumenta­
tion and on "hard" signs of trauma, such as gross tendon reflex changes and atrophy, that 
"occur far along the pathologic path," in a system of medical values that disfavors manipu­
lative clinical techniques as too "subjective." Goodley, supra note 42, at 1004. 
105. See, e.g., Office of Health Technology Assessment, Thermography for Indica­
tions Other Than Breast Lesions, cited in AM. C. OF RADIOLOGY BULL. 4-5 (1985). 
106. Henahan, Thermography Finds Multitude ofApplications, 247 J. A.M.A. 3296, 
3302 (1982), cited in REIN, supra note 2, at 14-4; Granelli, supra note 5, at 23, co\. 2. 
107. Granelli, supra note 5, at 23, co\. 1-2; See Crawford v. Shivashakar, 474 So. 2d 
873, 876 n.4 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985), where the dubious qualifications of the expert 
witness were among the several reasons for upholding the exclusion of thermographic 
evidence. 
108. See, e.g., Grennan and CaygiII, Infra-Red Thermography in the Assessment of 
Sacro-lliac Inflammation, 21 RHEUMATOLOGY AND REHABILITATION 81, 83 (1982). 
109. Henahan, supra note 106, at 3302. Attempts to establish a statistically "nor­
mal" temperature may underlay the lukewarm findings of one study which concluded that 
thermography was of little value in the early diagnosis of a degenerative condition of the 
sacro-i1iac, although it might be helpful in the serial assessment of the condition in individ­
ual patents. Grennan and CaygiII, supra note 108, at 82, 87. 
110. Goodley, supra note 42, at 1003-04. 
111. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
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forerunner of the modem polygraph, 112 administered to the defendant. 
The court of appeals affirmed, 113 noting, as virtually the entirety of its 
opinion, that "while courts will go a long way in admitting expert tes­
timony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discov­
ery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently 
established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in 
which it belongs.""4 
This decision, with its enunciation of a "general acceptance" stan­
dard, imposed a special burden on the admissibility of so-called scien­
tific evidence in the form of an absolute rule. Under Frye, the 
proponent of evidence obtained by means of a recent scientific or tech­
nical theory, technique, or device must demonstrate that the source is 
generally accepted by the relevant scientific community in addition to 
proving its relevance."S 
Frye has been criticised often and ably.1I6 The original opinion 
gives no authority, purpose, or definitions for the standard, leaving it 
for courts which apply the general acceptance test to give some defini­
tion to its parameters." 7 Perhaps as a result, the test has been applied 
selectively.1l8 Courts have wrestled individually not only with the 
question of when, but of how to apply the standard; identifying the 
appropriate field; determining whether the underlying principle and 
technique have been "generally accepted" by members of that field; 
deciding what must be accepted (i.e., the underlying principle, the 
technique applying the principle, or both); and determining what types 
of proof establish acceptance. 119 Not surprisingly, these problems 
have been variously resolved. 120 Moreover, critics have pointed out 
that the general acceptance standard may exclude reliable and relevant 
112. Giannelli, supra note 1, at 1204 n.4l. 
113. Frye, 293 F. 1013, 1014. 
114. Id. at 1014. 
115. See Giannelli, supra note 1, at 1205. 
116. See, e.g., Giannelli, supra note 1, at 1206-07 n.59; Imwinkelried, A New Era in 
the Evolution of Scientific Evidence - A Primer on Evaluating the Weight of Scientific 
Evidence, 23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 261, 263 & n.29 (1981). 
117. Giannelli, supra note 1, at 1205, 1208; C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE, § 203, at 
605-06 (3d ed. 1984). 
118. MCCORMICK, supra note 117, § 203, at 606 n.6; Giannelli, supra note 1, at 
1219-21; McCormick, Scientific Evidence: Defining a New Approach to Admissibility, 67 
IOWA L. REV. 879, 884 (1982) (test applied consistently only where admissibility of poly­
graph results at issue; not applied in leading cases admitting expert testimony on finger­
printing, ballistics, intoxication tests, and x-rays) [hereinafter cited as McCormick, 
Scientific Evidence]. 
119. See Giannelli, supra note 1, at 1208-19. 
120. Id. 
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evidence because it seems to require a "cultural lag" between the in­
troduction of a theory or technique and its admissibility.12I At the 
same time, application of the Frye standard does not guarantee that 
unreliable evidence will be exc1uded. 122 Concentration on the issue of 
general acceptance may obscure factors that have more bearing on the 
reliability and probative value of a technique than does its acceptance 
in the appropriate field. 123 
The most adamant position against the Frye test is that of McCor­
mick, who argues that the traditional standards of relevancy and the 
need for expertise to assist the factfinder should govern the admissibil­
ity of new scientific developments: 
General scientific acceptance is a proper condition for taking judi­
cial notice of scientific facts, but it is not a suitable criterion for the 
admissibility of scientific evidence. Any relevant conclusion sup­
ported by a qualified expert witness should be received unless there 
are distinct reasons for exclusion. These reasons are the familiar 
ones of prejudicing or misleading the jury or consuming undue 
amounts of time. 124 
This approach not only provides adequate protection against invalid 
and unreliable techniques, McCormick maintains, but properly fo­
cuses the court's attention on the actual usefulness of the evidence and 
issues of jury prejudice and unnecessary expense. 125 
The general acceptance standard, however, has also garnered sup­
port. Fear that juries would be overinfluenced by the aura of "mystic 
infallibility" that sometimes seems to surround scientific pronounce­
ments has led courts to uphold Frye as a means of ensuring that "a 
minimal reserve of experts exists who can critically examine the valid­
121. Giannelli, supra note I, at 1223; United States v. Sample, 378 F. Supp. 44, 53 
(E.D. Pa. 1974) (Frye's preclusion of relevant evidence "frustrates the search for truth"). 
122. The most notorious example is the paraffin test, designed to detect whether re­
cent firing of a firearm had left a residue on the user's hand. Although the test was widely 
used by law enforcement agencies, results of the first comprehensive evaluation of the test 
were not published until 1967. The study found the paraffin test unreliable. At that time, 
paraffin test evidence had been admitted under Frye for 30 years. Giannelli, supra note I, 
at 1224-25. 
123. For example, in the case of the paraffin test for gunshot residues, see supra note 
122, the problem was nonspecificity; many common substances gave positive results, as did 
gunshot residues. Id. at 1226-27. See also Strong, Questions Affecting the Admissibility 0/ 
Scientific Evidence, 1970 U. ILL. L.F. 1, 14 (1970). 
124. MCCORMICK, supra note 117, § 203, at 608 (citations omited). 
125. Id. at 608-09. McCormick's approach would not, however, completely disre­
gard the acceptance question; "general scientific opinion of both underlying principles and 
particular applications" could be considered as a factor in evaluating the worth of the evi­
dence offered. Id. at 609. 
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ity of a scientific determination in a particular case."126 The general 
acceptance standard has also been deemed necessary protection 
against protracted "battles of experts," which create confusion and di­
vert time and resources to collateral issues. 127 Critics have pointed 
out, however, that these concerns can be addressed within the usual 
rules of evidence, as can the ultimate purpose of the Frye rule - "the 
prevention of the introduction into evidence of specious and un­
founded scientific principles or conclusions based upon such princi­
pies." 128 One commentator concluded that the principle justification 
for the general acceptance standard is that it establishes a method for 
ensuring the reliability of scientific evidence that assures that those 
most qualified to assess the validity of a scientific method will have a 
determinative voice. 129 
Despite the apparent weaknesses and extensive criticism of the 
general acceptance standard, it has dominated the admissibility of sci­
entific evidence since its introduction. 130 The litigant planning to offer 
evidence, such as thermograms, to which the Frye test may apply must 
be prepared to deal with the rule as it has been construed in the liti­
gant's jurisdiction. 
There has been some support for the position that Frye (or some 
other enhanced burden on admissibility) appropriately applies in the 
criminal context, but that it should not or does not apply in civillitiga­
tion. 131 In fact, however, although Frye is more often cited in criminal 
cases, it has been applied without comment in civil cases. 132 
126. United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1974). But see Gian­
nelli, supra note 1, at 1207, nn.60 & 65; MCCORMICK, supra note 117, § 203, at 609 (not all 
scientific evidence carries with it an aura of infallibility). One commentator suggests that 
such dangers are especially likely where the evidence was produced with the aid of a 
mechanical device or "scientific paraphernalia." Strong, supra note 123, at 13. 
127. Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 388, 391 A.2d 364, 371-72 (1978); Commonwealth 
v. Fatalo, 346 Mass. 266, 269, 191 N.E.2d 479, 481 (1963). 
128. Strong, supra note 123, at 14; See Giannelli, supra note 1, at 1207. 
129. Giannelli, supra note 1, at 1207; United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 743-44 
(D.C. Cir. 1974). 
130. Giannelli, supra note 1, at 1205. 
131. I D. LOUISELL & c. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE, § 107, at 853 (1977); 
Giannelli, supra note 1, at 1246, 1248. 
132. See 1 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 131, § 107, at 853 n.24; see also 
Miller v. Miller, 40 Conn. Supp. 66, 481 A.2d 428 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1984) (upholding 
admissibility of human leukocyte antigen (HLA) test in civil paternity suit); Shaeffer v. 
General Motors Corp., 372 Mass. 171, 360 N.E.2d 1062 (1977) (computer simulation of 
accident admissible only if general acceptance standard met, in product liability action). 
Cf Ellis v. International Playtex, Inc., 745 F.2d 292, 303-04 (4th Cir. 1984) (exclusion of 
government studies on toxic shock syndrome constituted reversible error; defendant's at­
tacks on methodology of the studies went to weight of evidence, not admissibility; but held 
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B. Current Status of the General Acceptance Standard 
The present status of Frye is unclear. The essential vagueness of 
the test and the weight of criticism directed at it have caused the stan­
dard to be developed differently, modified, and applied selectively in 
different courts. J33 The effect of the adoption of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence in 1975, and the Federal Rules' effect on numerous states' 
rules,134 is uncertain. At least one commentator believes that the cu­
mulative effect of Federal Rules 401 and 403 135 is to abolish Frye.136 
Another suggests that Frye is to some extent subsumed under Rules 
702137 and 703,138 which govern the admission of expert opinion testi­
mony.139 It is argued that because a judge will rarely be familiar with 
the scientific technique in question, he will have to base a Rule 703 
judgment on evidence that other experts would rely on the same facts 
in a non-litigation context, a kind of general acceptance standard. l40 
Under this formulation, the Frye test would seem to have no independ­
ent existence in jurisdictions where the Federal Rules are in effect. 
On the other hand, nothing in the Federal Rules, their history, or 
the advisory committee comments demonstrates an intention to repu­
that studies met Frye standard as falling within Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8)(C) hearsay 
exception (fact findings by public agency presumed trustworthy». 
133. See infra notes 144·66 and accompanying text. 
134. See McCormick, Scientific Evidence, supra note 118, at 886-87; see discussion of 
effect of passage of rules tracking Federal Rules of Evidence in Idaho in Gunn, Thermogra­
phy: Objective Evidence of Nerve and Soft-Tissue Injury, 21 IDAHO L. REV. 117, 126-27 
(1985). 
135. Rule 401 defines logical relevancy. FED. R. EVID. 401; Rule 403 provides for 
the exclusion of relevant evidence whose probative value is outweighed by the harm likely 
to result from its admission. FED. R. EVID. 403. 
136. 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 5168 
(1978). See Giannelli, supra note I, at 1230 ("Because scientific evidence could be shown to 
be reliable and thus relevant under Rule 401 without regard to its general acceptance in the 
scientific community, and because none of the exclusions enumerated in Rule 402 is appli­
cable, the Federal Rules have provided a standard of admissibility inconsistent with 
Frye."). See also id. at 1229 n.249; Imwinkelreid, supra note 116, at 266. 
137. FED. R. EvID. 702. 
138. FED. R. EVID. 703. 
139. Note, Novel Scientific Evidence, 48 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 774, 781-83 (1980). 
Rule 702 permits the introduction of expert testimony when it will assist the fact finder to 
understand evidence or decide an issue. FED. R. EVID. 702. Rule 703 refers to facts and 
data upon which expert opinion is based and notes that they need not be admissible if of a 
type reasonably relied upon by experts in the field. FED. R. EVID. 703. See Kennedy v. 
State, 640 P .2d 971, 977 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982) (Frye test read into state version of Rule 
702). 
140. Note, supra note 139, at 783. See S. SALTZBURY & K. REDDEN, FEDERAL 
RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 426 (2d ed. 1977) (not clear whether Rule 703 codifies Frye 
test or establishes a less demanding standard for scientific evidence). 
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diate Frye. 141 The Rules were not intended to be a comprehensive 
codification; some evidentiary rules are not covered, while others are 
treated only generally.142 Since Frye was the established rule and it 
was not expressly repudiated, arguably the general acceptance stan­
dard still governs. 143 
Certainly, although a few state courts have taken the position that 
the Federal Rules of Evidence overruled Frye,l44 the federal courts of 
appeals appear unwilling to abandon the general acceptance standard 
entirely, either on the basis of the rules or on account of critical indict­
ments of the standard. Federal appellate court decisions of the last ten 
years, like those of a number of state courts, have tended to modify 
Frye without rejecting it outright. 
For example, some commentators have concluded that United 
States v. Williams l45 rejected the Frye test in favor of a relevancy ap­
proach in the course of its decision to admit spectrographic voice iden­
tification evidence. 146 In fact, the Second Circuit only limited the 
applicability of the general acceptance standard. 147 The court cited 
McCormick's theory that Frye is a proper condition for taking judicial 
notice of scientific facts, but not for the admissibility of evidence, 148 
adding that a distinction must be made "between founding broad legal 
principles on current scientific 'truths' . . . and admitting particular 
scientific evidence as probative of an element of a crime."149 It can be 
141. McCormick, Scientific Evidence, supra note 118, at 888; Giannelli, supra note 1, 
at 1229 (Rules are silent as to whether general acceptance standard is superseded). 
142. Giannelli, supra note 1, at 1229. 
143. Id. See 1 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 131, § 105, at 818 (Frye 
standard has probably survived enactment of the Rules, and will continue to be applied in 
determining relevancy under Rule 401). For other analyses of viability of Frye under new 
Rules, see sources cited in MCCORMICK, supra note 117, § 203, at 607 n.24. 
144. State v. Williams, 388 A.2d 500, 504 (Me. 1978); Barmeyer v. Montana Power 
Co., 657 P.2d 594, 598 (Mont. 1983); People v. Daniels, 102 Misc. 2d 540, 546-47, 422 
N.Y.S.2d 832, 837 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979); State v. Williams, 4 Ohio St.3d 53, 58, 446 N.E.2d 
444,447 (1983); Whalen v. State, 434 A.2d 1346, 1354 (Del. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 
910 (1982); Cf State v. Hall, 297 N.W.2d 80, 84-85 (Iowa), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 927 
(1980) (overrulling Frye; at this time, Iowa had not adopted rules based on the Federal 
Rules of Evidence, although the following year the Iowa Supreme Court appointed a com­
mission to study the rules with a view towards adoption). McCormick, Scientific Evidence, 
supra note 118, at 887 n.51. 
145. 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 (1979). 
146. See, e.g., McCormick, Scientific Evidence. supra note 118, at 895, 897; Im­
winkelried, supra note 116, at 266-67; Note, supra note 139, at 780; Rein, Thermography: 
Medical and Legal Implications, TRIAL, February 1984, at 46, 49. 
147. See McCormick, Scientific Evidence, supra note 118, at 895-96; MCCORMICK, 
supra note 117, § 203, at 606 n.20. 
148. MCCORMICK, supra note 117, § 203, at 608. 
149. 583 F.2d at 1198 n.7. 
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inferred that, unlike McCormick, the Second Circuit would find Frye 
appropriate where novel scientific evidence was offered in support of a 
"broad legal principle."150 Although the court then applied a Rule 
401/403 151 relevancy balancing approach to the admissibility issue, 152 
in the course of its deliberations it considered the acceptance of spec­
trography's underlying principles and of the device used to produce 
spectrograms by technical and legal commentators and by courts,153 
all factors in a general acceptance analysis. 154 A certain degree of ac­
ceptance in the scientific community was recognized as necessary to 
the finding of reliability that must precede admission.155 Thus Frye, 
although limited and modified, is still present in Williams .156 
Similiarly, Coppolino v. State157 is a decision by a state's highest 
court that has been widely hailed as rejecting the general acceptance 
standard. 158 Coppolino upheld the admissibility of tests for the detec­
tion of a certain poison which were specially developed for the prose­
cution in that case. The court of appeals acknowledged that it was 
bound by the Frye standard, but found no abuse of the trial court's 
discretion in admitting the test results and conclusion therefrom. 159 
This result may carry the concept of discretion beyond its outermost 
limits; 160 it is perhaps better explained as one of several cases admit­
150. As examples of instances where courts established broad legal principles on 
then-current scientific theories, the opinion cites two cases. 583 F.2d at 1198 n.7. The first 
of these, Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927), upheld a state statute allowing sterilization of 
"mentally defective" individuals on the basis of the "fact" that "heredity is important in 
the transmission of insanity [and] imbecility." Buck, 274 U.S. at 206. The more modem 
case cited is Brown v. Board of Education, 374 U.S. 483 (1954), where the holding that 
public school segregation on the basis of race adversely affects the "hearts and minds" of 
those segregated was bolstered by reference to "modem [psychological] authority." Brown, 
347 U.S. at 494. The court specifically cited studies of the psychological and developmental 
effects of discrimination and segregation on black children. Id. at 494 n.ll. 
151. FED. R. EVID. 401,403. 
152. Williams, 583 F.2d at 1198-1200. 
153. Id. at 1196-97 nn.3, 6. 
154. See infra notes 257-59 and accompanying text. 
155. Williams, 583 F.2d at 1198. See Note, supra note 139, at 786-87. 
156. Note that a more recent Connecticut superior court case held a human leuko­
cyte antigen (HLA) test admissible in a civil paternity suit, stating that the test satisfies the 
Frye standard as adopted by the Second Circuit in Williams, "which held that there must 
be a preliminary showing that scientific evidence is sufficiently established to have gained 
general acceptance in its field." Miller v. Miller, 40 Conn. Supp. 66, 69, 481 A.2d 428, 429­
30 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1984). 
157. 223 So. 2d 68 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968), appeal dismissed mem., 234 So. 2d 120 
(Fla. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 927 (1970). 
158. See, e.g., I D. LOUISELL & c. MUELLER, supra note 131, § 105, at 824-25; 
McCormick, Scientific Evidence. supra note 118, at 889. 
159. Coppolino, 223 So. 2d at 70-71. 
160. McCormick, Scientific Evidence. supra note 118, at 889-90. 
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ting evidence derived from tests specifically developed to explore a 
given problem without applying Frye. 161 
Commentators cite a number of state court cases allegedly re­
jecting the general acceptance standard. 162 In the majority of these 
cases, however, the refusal to apply Frye extends only to evidence de­
rived from the particular scientific principle, technique, device, or re­
sult offered in that case. 163 Furthermore, state courts that rejected the 
Frye standard have usually done so on trial records containing persua­
sive evidence of the validity and reliability of the principles and tech­
niques involved. 164 Such cases offer no guarantees that the Frye test 
will not be applied in another context. 165 It appears that only those 
jurisdictions that categorically reject Frye as incompatible with the 
Federal Rules of Evidence166 should consistently refuse to require gen­
eral acceptance as a foundation. 
Although very few courts have abrogated Frye in toto, a great 
number have modified the standard. Perhaps the least radical modifi­
cation is the substitution of a requirement of "substantial acceptance" 
for general acceptance in the relevant scientific community.167 The 
161. 1 D. LOUISELL & c. MUELLER, supra note 131, § 105, at 824-25. This excep­
tion to the Frye test was proposed by A. MOENSSENS, R. MOSES & F. INBAU, SCIENTIFIC 
EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES § 1.03 (1973). See also Phillips ex. rei. Utah State Dept. of 
Social Servs. v. Jackson, 615 P.2d 1228, 1234 (Utah 1980) (scientific test designed specifi­
cally for purpose of a lawsuit admissible with sufficient proof of reliability). Cf Ellis v. 
International Playtex, Inc., 745 F.2d 292, 303 (4th Cir. 1984) (questions re: methodology 
of government studies of toxic shock syndrome went to weight, not admissibility, of evi­
dence); Ex parte Dolvin, 391 So. 2d 677, 679-80 (Ala. 1980) (comparison of remains with 
photograph of alleged victim not subject to Frye); Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 
626,638 (D.C. App. 1979) (only methodology used in study of battered women must meet 
Frye standard); Commonwealth v. Devlin, 346 Mass. 266, 191 N.E.2d 479 (1963) (expert's 
identification of human remains claimed to be those of murder victim by comparison of 
ante mortem and post mortem x-rays was not subject to general acceptance standard, 
where conclusion was based on empirical analysis and expert was one of three or four 
people in the country with expertise in area). 
162. See MCCORMICK, supra note 117, § 203, at 606-07; McCormick, Scientific Evi­
dence, supra note 118, at 897-901. 
163. E.g., State v. Catanese, 368 So. 2d 975, 980 (La. 1979) (standard is "an unjustifi­
able obstacle to the admission of polygraph test results" (emphasis added»; State v. Wil­
liams, 4 Ohio St.3d 53, 58-59,446 N.E.2d 444, 447-48 (1983) (spectrogram need not meet 
Frye standard to be admissible (emphasis added». 
164. McCormick, Scientific Evidence, supra note 118, at 901. 
165. See, e.g., People v. Marx, 54 Cal. App. 3d 100, 126 Cal. Rptr. 350 (1975) (where 
bitemark evidence offered, issue of technique's acceptance goes only to weight, not admissi­
bility, of evidence); People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18,641 P.2d 775, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, cert. 
denied, 459 U.S. 860 (1982) (hypnotically enhanced testimony excluded under Frye 
standard). 
166. See supra note 144. 
167. United States v. Gould, 741 F.2d 45, 48-49 (4th Cir. 1984); United States v. 
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test remains as a foundational requirement bearing on admissibility, 
but is less stringent than the Frye standard. 168 The substantial accept­
ance standard calls for "some degree of proven acceptance within the 
appropriate discipline of the 'generalized proposition that constitutes 
the major premise of the relevance syllogism,' ... and to this extent it 
retains the essential feature of the Frye test."169 
Another formulation equates general acceptance with the reliabil­
ity of the scientific principle or technique from which the evidence is 
derived. 170 The rationale underlying this approach appears to be that 
only scientific basis yielding uniform, reliable results are of value to the 
truth seeking function. l7l The standards are not synonomous; a tech­
nique that is "reliable, or sufficiently accurate"172 need not be gener­
ally accepted.173 The standard is also a long step away from Frye in 
Torniero, 735 F.2d 725, 731 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Williams, 443 F. Supp. 269, 
273 (S.D.N.Y.), ajJ'd, 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1117 (1979); 
State v. Temple, 302 N.C. 1,273 S.E.2d 273 (1981); Cf State v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 
(2d Cir. 1978). 
168. United States v. Gould, 741 F.2d 45,49 n.2 (4th Cir. 1984). Cf United States v. 
Baller, 519 F.2d 463 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019 (1975). The Baller decision 
stated that "[a]bsolute certainty of result or unanimity of scientific opinion is not required 
for admissibility," holding that spectrographic evidence could be admitted so long as it 
satisfied a Rule 401/403 balancing analysis, as any other expert testimony. [d. at 466. The 
Gould court was confronted with an offer of evidence of a pathological gambling disorder 
as an insanity defense. It held that a relevancy analysis, treating the validity of new scien­
tific techniques as going to the weight of the evidence, to be decided by factfinders, "may be 
acceptable practice" where admission "involves no more than the consideration of an addi­
tional item of evidence in a chain of proof." However, "it is not acceptable where accept­
ance of the general hypothesis is tantamount to exculpation from otherwise proven guilt." 
Gould, 741 F.2d at 49 n.2. This concern with the admission of evidence which seems to 
sweep so broadly that it somehow bypasses the jury's function and dictates the decision on 
ultimate issues appears to underlay many decisions mandating application of the Frye stan­
dard to polygraph results. See. e.g., Commonwealth v. Vitello, 376 Mass. 426, 445, 381 
N.E.2d 582, 593 (1978). 
169. Gould, 741 F.2d at 49 n.2 (citation omitted). 
170. United States v. Distler, 671 F.2d 954, 961 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 
U.S. 827 (1981); United States v. Tranowski, 659 F.2d 750, 756-57 (7th Cir. 1981) (astro­
nomical calculation of date of photo, computed trigonometrically on basis of shadow 
length); United States v. Franks, 511 F.2d 25, 33 n.12 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 
(1975) (spectrographic evidence). State courts have applied the standard to a number of 
scientific techniques. McCormick, Scientific Evidence. supra note 118, at 892 n.83. 
171. See State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 536, 432 A.2d 86, 91 (1981). 
172. United States v. Franks, 511 F.2d 25, 33 n.12 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 
1042 (1975). 
173. Lipton, The Results of Scientific Techniques as Evidence in Federal Courts: 
Evolution of the Frye v. United States Standard in the Period 1969-1977, 8 ENVTL. L. 769, 
774 (1978). By the same token, the implicit assumption of Frye - that a technique will 
undergo rigorous testing, sufficient to establish its validity, before it is accepted by the 
community - is not necessarily true. See discussion of the paraffin test, supra notes 122 & 
123 and accompanying text. See Giannelli, supra note I, at 1225; see also D'Arc v. D'Arc, 
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that the general acceptance test requires the court to evaluate only the 
degree to which members of the relevant scientific community have 
found a principle or technique to be useful and reliable; the reliability 
standard moves that judgment into court, where, with the aid of ex­
perts, judges make the reliability determination that Frye attempted to 
place in the scientific community. 
A third modification of the Frye test treats general acceptance as 
one factor among the considerations determining admissibility. Some 
cases, including United States v. Williams,174 designate a degree of ac­
ceptance as an element of the reliability of a scientific technique; relia­
bility is then incorporated into a probativeness/prejudice analysis to 
determine admissibility.175 These cases are not uniform in their treat­
ment of Frye. In Williams, the standard is subtly reincorporated after 
its apparant rejection by the Second Circuit's conclusion that "a tech­
nique unable to gamer any support, or only miniscule support, within 
the scientific community would be found unreliable by a court,"176 
and by the inclusion of "the existence and maintenance of standards" 
governing the use of the technique by professional organizations as 
one indicator of reliability.177 Williams lists five indicia of reliabil­
ity,178 but indicates that not all must be present in every case as a 
prerequisite to admissibility.179 The Third Circuit in a recent deci­
sion180 endorsed a modified Frye test more directly as "neither a neces­
sary nor a sufficient condition for admissibility; it is, however, one 
factor that a district court normally should consider in deciding 
whether to admit evidence based upon [a novel scientific] tech­
nique."181 The evaluation of the technique's acceptance in the field is 
part of a determination of the evidence's reliability, 182 and reliability is 
part of a traditional balancing analysis. 183 Acceptance may be the de­
157 N.J. Super. 553, 385 A.2d 278 (1978) (general acceptance and reliability are distinct 
standards; evidence satisfying either is admissible). 
174. 583 F.2d 1194, discussed supra text accompanying notes 145-49. 
175. Id. at 1198. See also United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224,1237-41 (3d Cir. 
1985); United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541, 556 (6th Cir. 1977) (citing United States v. 
Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 1973». 
176. Williams, 583 F.2d at 1\98. 
177. Id. 
178. Id. at 1198-99. 
179. Id. at 1200 n.12. 
180. United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985). 
181. !d. at 1237. 
182. Id. at 1238-39. 
183. Id. at 1237 (admissibility determined by preliminary inquiry concerning: (1) 
reliability of the technique, (2) possibility of confusing or misleading the jury, and (3) 
relevance). 
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cisive factor in establishing the reliability of the evidence. 184 An even 
stronger position has been taken in the Sixth and Ninth Circuits, 
where "conformity to a generally accepted explanatory theory" is one 
of four mandatory criteria for the admission of expert testimony.18s 
The strictest adherence to a pre-Federal Rules of Evidence Frye 
standard is that of the circuit that originated the test. Without con­
ducting its own analysis of the accuracy of spectrographic voice identi­
fication evidence, the District of Columbia circuit held it was wrongly 
admitted when one expert witness testified that the technique was in­
accurate. 186 General acceptance, required for admission of "new 
methods of scientific investigation,"187 was held to require virtually 
unanimous support by members of the relevant scientific commu­
nity.188 A similar "nose count" led a District of Columbia trial court 
to exclude polygraph evidence offered in a libel case. 189 
184. Id. at 1238-39. The court held, however, that where a technique has no estab­
lished "track record," reliability may be otherwise established. [d. (citing Coppolino v. 
State, 223 So. 2d 68 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968), appeal dismissed mem., 234 So. 2d 120 
(Fla. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 927 (1970». 
185. United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 511, 556 (6th Cir. 1977) (holding evidence of 
hair comparisons derived from ion microprobic analysis inadmissible for failure to meet 
general acceptance threshold requirement) (citing United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 
1152 (9th CiT. 1973». The remaining factors are: qualified expert, proper subject, and 
probative value compared to prejudicial effect. Id. at 556-57. See also United States v. 
Smith, 736 F.2d 1103, 1106-07 (6th Cir. 1984) (such testimony may now "be said to con­
form to a generally accepted explanatory theory"), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 213 (1984). Cj. 
United States v. Franks, 511 F.2d 25,33 n.12 (6th Cir. 1975) (holding general acceptance 
synonymous with reliability), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975). 
186. United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 745 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
187. [d. at 743. 
188. Id. at 744-45. The court counted one expert who testified, one major published 
study, and two articles supporting the reliability and acceptance of the technique, as against 
one testifying expert who strongly opposed the technique, and one article whose authors 
were "dubious, or at least unconvinced" of the reliability of the spectrographic analysis. 
[d. See Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626,638 (D.C. App. 1979) (Frye applies only 
to "scientific methodology," not to particular results based thereon). The conservative val­
ues of Addison were cited with approval in People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 31, 549 P.2d 
1240, 1244, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144, 148 (1976) and Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 385-87, 391 
A.2d 364, 370 (1978), both of which also held spectrographic evidence admitted errone­
ously. But see People v. McDonald, 36 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 2201, 2202 (Cal. Dec. 19, 
1984) (Frye not applicable to evidence regarding perception of eyewitnesses); People v. 
Marx, 54 Cal. App. 3d 100, 110, 126 Cal. Rptr. 350, 355-56 (1975) (general acceptance 
goes to weight, not admissibility, of bite mark evidence, where evidence is based on hypoth­
esis that is demonstrable in court). 
189. Dowd v. Calabrese, 585 F. Supp. 430, 431-32 (D. D. C. 1984) (survey of sci en­
tists in field showing that 61 % consider technique a useful diagnostic tool fails to meet Frye 
requirements). 
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V. MEETING THE FRYE STANDARD: THERMOGRAMS AS 

EVIDENCE IN MASSACHUSETTS COURTS 

A. The General Acceptance Standard in Massachusetts 
The foregoing survey demonstrates both the variety and the te­
nacity of the general acceptance standard. The litigant with thermo­
graphic evidence to offer at trial must be prepared with an offer of 
proof that will satisfy the court that the evidence meets the Frye test as 
construed in that jurisdiction, or alternatively, that Frye is inapplica­
ble. Taking Massachusetts as a paradigm, this article will consider the 
various factors involved in the admission of thermograms in a civil 
suit. 190 
Massachusetts' Supreme Judicial Court adopted the Frye stan­
dard when first confronted with the question of the admissibility of 
polygraph results offered by the defendant in a criminal proceeding. 191 
The standard was invoked in upholding the exclusion of the test re­
sults on the ground that scientists and "other authorities" considering 
the polygraph had expressed grave doubts as to the reliability of both 
the basic premises and the techniques employed in administering the 
"lie detector" test. 192 Later decisions, continuing to apply a general 
acceptance standard, held polygraph results admissible at the trial 
judge's discretion where the defendant stipulates in advance to their 
admissibility,193 and then only for the limited purpose of impeaching 
or corroborating the defendant's testimony.194 
Writing for the court in Commonwealth v. Vitello,195 Justice 
Liacos stated that the Frye standard as adopted in Massachusetts ad­
dresses "practical concerns and policy considerations" raised by ex­
pert testimony based on newly developed scientific knowledge. 196 In 
the case of polygraph evidence, these concerns are confusion and prej­
190. The admissibility of thermographic evidence would be a matter of first impres­
sion in Massachusetts. 
191. Commonwealth v. Fatalo, 346 Mass. 266, 269,191 N.E.2d 479,480-81 (1963). 
192. Id. at 268-69, 191 N.E.2d at 480. At the same time, the court noted that other 
novel scientific evidence, including blood tests excluding paternity, blood alcohol content 
tests, fingerprint and ballistic evidence, had been admitted in Massachusetts without any 
specific application of Frye upon a showing of "substantial authority establishing scientific 
reliability." Id. at 269-70, 191 N.E.2d at 481. 
193. Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 365 Mass. 421,425-26,313 N.E.2d 120, 123-24 
(1974). 
194. Commonwealth v. Vitello, 376 Mass. 426, 453-57, 381 N.E.2d 582, 596-99 
(1978). 
195. 376 Mass. 426, 381 N.E.2d 582 (1978). 
196. Id. at 441-47, 381 N.E.2d at 591-96. 
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udice of the jury, intrusion into the jury's function, and undue con­
sumption of time and trial resources. 197 In this, the test as applied "is 
not so far removed. ., from the approach espoused by McCor­
mick."198 The court's primary evidentiary concern, however, was 
with the reliability of the technique about which there were still "sub­
stantial doubts."199 Frye appears to have been selected to justify the 
exclusion of evidence whose reliability is suspect. 
In Commonwealth v. Neal,2°O two challenges to a conviction of 
driving under the influence of alcohol were defeated through the appli­
cation of Frye. 201 The defendant claimed that his constitutional right 
to any exculpatory evidence in the Commonwealth's possession re­
quired police to preserve the ampules used in his breathalyzer test for 
retesting by his own expert. 202 The court held that, because the retest­
ing process had not been generally accepted and retest evidence would 
therefore not be admissible, it could not constitute exculpatory evi­
dence and no constitutional right was triggered. The defendant then 
excepted to the admission of blood alcohol content evidence based on 
the breathalyzer test, offering expert testimony that the device used 
was not reliable because it was susceptible to radio frequency interfer­
ence.203 Because breathalyzer results had been deemed generally ac­
cepted, the court held that one expert's opinion was not sufficient to 
require exclusion of the evidence.204 
In an opinion dealing with the Frye standard in a civil context, 
the Supreme Judicial Court indicated that evidence derived from com­
puter-simulated accident reconstruction is subject to the general ac­
ceptance test. 205 The court did not deny the intrinsic reliability of 
computer calculations per se, but indicated concern with "the accu­
racy and completeness of the initial data and equations which are used 
as ingredients of the computer program," particularly in the face of 
disagreement among authorities as to the reliability of computer 
197. Id. 
198. Id. at 443 n.17, 381 N.E.2d at 592 n.17. 
199. Id. at 441-42, 381 N.E.2d at 591-92. 
200. 392 Mass. I, 464 N.E.2d 1356 (1984). 
201. Id. at 6, 464 N.E.2d at 1361. 
202. Id. at 12-13,464 N.E.2d at 1364-65. 
203. Id. at 16-17,464 N.E.2d at 1366-67. 
204. Id. at 17-18,464 N.E.2d at 1367-68. The court did hold that the challenge was 
sufficient to require admission of test results to be conditioned on a foundation showing 
that the machine used was not so susceptible to interference as to create a "significant risk" 
of an inaccurate result. Id. at 19,464 N.E.2d at 1368. 
205. Schaeffer v. General Motors Corp., 372 Mass. 171, 178,360 N.E.2d 1062,1067 
(1977). 
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simulation.206 
The Massachusetts court has also carved out two interesting ex­
ceptions to its application of the Frye test. In Commonwealth v. Dev­
!in,207 the court held the general acceptance standard did not apply to 
an expert's identification of remains, claimed by the prosecution to be 
those of the murder victim, by means of comparison of antemortem 
and postmortem x-rays.20B The identification was based on the ex­
pert's opinion, derived empirically from his comparisons of thousands 
of x-rays, that no two adults have identical bone structures.209 The. 
expert testified that he was one of three or four persons qualified to 
make such identifications, that he had identified unknown human re­
mains by this method before, but that neither he nor anyone else had 
ever testified to such an identification.210 
Had Frye been applied, it would almost certainly have acted to 
exclude this evidence. There was no showing of general acceptance (it 
is by no means clear what the relevant field would be, in any case), no 
demonstration of the technique's reliability, and no "track record." 
Instead, the court held that the evidence was the expert's "medical 
opinion" rather than the product of a scientific theory, and therefore 
not subject to Frye. 21I In fact, not only did this evidence involve the 
scientific theory that each adult's bone structure is visibly distinctive, 
but it depended on a unique application of that theory to identify de­
composed remains, whereas the theory had been developed through 
comparison of x-rays of living bodies. The court seems to have been 
comfortable with this evidence because the use and reading of x-rays is 
generally accepted, and because this particular technique was capable 
of demonstration in court, allowing the jury to make the same visual 
comparisons as those upon which the expert based his conclusions.212 
Although the court did not find reliability established according to the 
Frye requirements, the policy considerations enumerated in Vitello 213 
were adequately safeguarded. 
206. Id. at 177-78,360 N.E.2d at 1067. 
207. 365 Mass. 149,310 N.E.2d 353 (1974). 
208. Id. at 152-55, 310 N.E.2d at 355-57. 
209. Id. at 153, 310 N.E.2d at 356. 
210. Id. at 153-54, 310 N.E.2d at 356. 
211. Id. at 155, 310 N.E.2d at 357. 
212. Id. at 154-55, 310 N.E.2d at 357. See also Ex parte Dolvin, 391 So. 2d 677 (Ala. 
1980); People v. Marx, 54 Cal. App. 3d 100, 110, 126 Cal. Rptr. 350, 355-56 (1975) (Frye 
should apply only when evidence relies on hypotheses not capable of demonstration in 
court). 
213. 376 Mass. 426, 381 N.E.2d 582; see supra text accompanying note 197. 
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In Commonwealth v. Lykus,214 the court upheld the admission of 
spectrographic evidence under the general acceptance standard, de­
spite a substantial degree of criticism of the technique from experts.215 
The court chose to give greater weight to the acceptance of the tech­
nique by those experts who had "direct and empirical experience in 
the field of spectrography."216 The Frye standard is satisfied, the court 
held, "if the principle is generally accepted by those who would be 
expected to be familiar with its use."217 In Lykus, the relevant experts 
included scientists familiar with the underlying principles and their 
application, as well as criminal laboratory personnel,218 Thus, it is not 
clear that acceptance only by operators of a scientific device would 
satisfy the court. 
It is apparent that Massachusetts applies Frye widely but selec­
tively. Little assistance is offered 'by the first circuit, which seems to 
condition the admissibility of scientific evidence on proof of a method­
ology "that meets any of the standards of reliability applicable to sci­
entific evidence."219 Given the possible pitfalls of the general 
acceptance standard, there are a number of considerations in the ad­
mission of thermographic evidence. 
The practitioner who plans to introduce thermographic evidence 
should analyze and prepare the offering in terms of the particular 
problems that the Frye standard presents, beginning with the question 
of whether the general acceptance test applies. The suggested analysis 
below goes on to consider the court's role under Frye; the effect of the 
standard on the offeror's burden of proof, questions of what must be 
accepted, and to what degree, as well as how to identify the relevant 
field. Finally, the means of establishing general acceptance will be dis­
cussed. In general terms, the analysis is relevant to any litigant pro­
posing thermographic evidence under Frye. Specifically, the Issues 
have been worked through in terms of Massachusetts law. 
214. 367 Mass. 191, 327 N.E.2d 671 (1975). 
215. [d. at 204 n.6, 327 N.E.2d at 678 n.6. 
216. [d. 
217. [d. at 203, 327 N.E.2d at 678. In support of this formulation, the court cited 
People v. Williams, 164 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 858, 862, 331 P.2d 251,254 (Cal. App. Dep't 
Super. Ct. 1958). In Williams, however, the acceptance of members of the profession who 
had no familiarity with the technique (the Nalline test for detecting narcotic use) was not 
required to meet the general acceptance standard. The Lykus decision, in contrast, ex­
cluded from the "relevant field" experts in the field of speech who had studied spec­
trography and considered it unreliable. 367 Mass. at 204 n.6, 327 N.E.2d at 678 n.6. See 
Giannelli, supra note 1, at 1210. 
218. Lykus, 367 Mass. at 195,327 N.E.2d at 673. 
219. United States v. Fosher, 590 F.2d 381, 383 (1979) (citing both Frye, 293 F. 
1013, and Williams, 583 F.2d 1194). 
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B. At the Threshold: Is Frye Applicable? 
In certain situations, Frye is not applied. The scientific evidence 
offered may be derived from principles or techniques that are subject 
to judicial notice,220 in which case the technique has moved beyond 
the need for a general acceptance analysis. Thermography, however, 
is not yet sufficiently well-known to be the subject of judicial notice. It 
also seems unlikely that thermographic evidence would be exempted 
from the Frye test on the ground that it represented the kind of unique 
application of a scientific technique as seen in Coppolino or Devlin. 221 
Unlike the evidence admitted in those cases, thermography is capable 
of the historical evaluation contemplated by Frye. 
Nor should the litigant expect that the standard simply will not 
be applied by the court, despite the fact that Frye has been applied 
selectively in Massachusetts, as elsewhere.222 The Supreme Judicial 
Court has recently reiterated its adherence to Frye,223 and has made it 
clear that the test must be met in civil as well as in criminal cases.224 
Thermography is a likely candidate for the application of the Frye 
standard because it depends upon the reading of a mechanical 
device.225 
C. The Role of the Court 
While some courts have treated the general acceptance issue as a 
question of fact for the trial court, subject only to review for abuse of 
discretion,226 others view Frye as a matter of law, subject to de novo 
220. Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b) defines judically noticed facts as those "not 
subject to reasonable dispute" because generally known in the jurisdiction, or capable of 
determination through sources of unquestioned accuracy. FED. R. EVID. 20 1 (b). Recogni­
tion of certain fairly recent scientific techniques has reached the level of judicial notice. 
See, e.g., United States v. Fleishman, 684 F.2d 1329, 1337 (9th Cir. 1982) (handwriting 
analysis); Lipton, supra note 173, at 770 (radar-based measurement of vehicle speed). 
Cases have suggested that judicial notice may be triggered by admission of evidence based 
on the same principle or technique in "a significant number of other districts," United 
States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1241 (3d Cir. 1985), or by acceptance ofa technique in 
scientific and legal publications. Giannelli, supra note 1, at 1217. Such usage is "problem­
atical," id., and Massachusetts decisions have considered these factors only in making a 
determination as to acceptance of a scientific technique. See infra notes 286-88 and accom­
panying text. 
221. See supra notes 157-61 and accompanying text. 
222. See supra note 192. 
223. Commonwealth v. Neal, 392 Mass. at 12, 464 N.E.2d at 1364 (1984). 
224. Schaeffer v. General Motors Corp., 372 Mass. 171, 178, 360 N.E.2d 1062, 1067 
(1977). 
225. Strong, supra note 123, at 13. 
226. See, e.g., United States v. Fosher, 590 F.2d 381, 382 (1st Cir. 1979); United 
States v. Williams, 583 F.2d at 1200 n.12; United States v. Franks, 511 F.2d 25, 33 (6th Cir. 
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review on appeal. 227 The abuse of discretion standard tends to be as­
sociated with cases where distinctions between Frye and the relevancy 
approach are blurred; the cases usually present fairly strenuous modi­
fications of Frye. 228 Since the reliability of a scientific technique will 
not vary according to the circumstances of each case, deference to the 
trial judge's discretion on the threshold question of acceptance is not 
considered appropriate where the Frye standard is more strictly 
construed.229 
The Supreme Judicial Court has indicated that Massachusetts 
courts must treat the general acceptance standard as a mandatory 
question of law. The standard is "a rule of exclusion, giving general 
effect to policy considerations .... [a]s such it is to be distinguished 
from evidentiary considerations to be applied at the discretion of the 
judge or fact-finder. "230 Massachusetts courts confronted with an of­
fer of novel scientific evidence are instructed to conduct a hearing in 
the absence of the jury to determine if the technique and its proffered 
results meet the Frye standard, and to create a record for review by 
entering the findings of fact upon which the decision to admit or ex­
clude the evidence were based.231 
D. Placing the Burden of Proof 
Application of the Frye standard affects the burdens of produc­
tion and persuasion on the issue of admissibility. A relevancy ap­
1975); People v. Marx, 54 Cal. App. 3d 100, 109, 126 Cal. Rptr. 350, 355 (1975); Cop­
polino v. State, 223 So. 2d 68, 70-71 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969). In Crawford v. 
Shivashankar, 474 So. 2d 873, 876 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985), the appeals court upheld the 
trial judge's exclusion of therrnograms after they had been admitted in a Florida court in 
Fay v. Mincey, 454 So. 2d 587 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984), on the basis that there had been 
no abuse of discretion. These decisions apparently equate the general acceptance question 
with the admissibility of expert testimony, traditionally a matter for the trial judge's discre­
tion. See Fosher, 590 F.2d at 382. Qualifying the expert, however, can be distinguished 
from the "question of qualifying the process." Giannelli, supra note I, at 1223. 
227. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541, 556 (6th Cir. 1977); United 
States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 743-44 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 381, 
391 A.2d 364, 367-68 (1978). 
228. Supra notes 145-56 and accompanying text, (discussion of Williams, 583 F.2d 
1194); see also United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1237 (3d Cir. 1985); People v. 
Marx, 54 Cal. App. 3d 100, 110-12, 126 Cal. Rptr. 350, 355-57 (1975); Giannelli, supra 
note 1, at 1222. 
229. Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 381,391 A.2d 364,367 (1978). Although the relia­
bility of evidence is not affected by the circumstances of a case, the need for pre-admission 
guarantees of reliability may well vary from case to case. 
230. Commonwealth v. Vitello, 376 Mass. 426, 443 n.17, 381 N.E.2d 582, 592 n.17. 
23 I. Schaeffer v. General Motors Corp., 372 Mass. 171, 178, 360 N.E.2d 1062, 1067 
(1977). 
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proach, where probative value is balanced against the likelihood of 
harm (under the Federal Rules of Evidence, a Rule 4011403 analy­
sis),232 places the burden on the party opposing admission.233 Any 
relevant evidence is presumptively admissible, and the opponent of 
such evidence must show its tendency to mislead, prejudice, or confuse 
the jury.234 Some courts blend the issue of the helpfulness of expert 
testimony (Federal Rule of Evidence 702)235 into the threshold admis­
sibility analysis, on the ground that helpfulness is somewhat depen­
dent on whether the status of the body of knowledge upon which the 
expert bases his opinions is such that the opinions can be more than 
speculative.236 In those instances, the offeror of the evidence bears 
somewhat more of the burden.237 Where Frye is strictly applied, as in 
Massachusetts, the proponent of the evidence bears the full burden of 
proving general acceptance, while his opponent may await completion 
of such proof before coming forward with his own experts.238 
E. What must be "Generally Accepted"? 
Under Frye, it is unclear whether the underlying principle, the 
technique, or both must be generally accepted.239 Case language refer­
ring to acceptance of the "procedure," "technology," "technique," or 
"theory" does not always seem to represent either a conscious choice 
or a clear delineation.240 One commentator noted that this distinction 
is less than satisfactory, creating the same type of difficulties in appli­
cation as did the rule against opinion evidence.241 Where evidence is 
only meaningful because some general scientific proposition relates 
the evidence to the issue of the case, relevancy alone requires that the 
admissibility of the underlying proposition or theory be established.242 
Since establishing the underlying principle does not automatically vali­
232. FED. R. EVID. 401, 403. 
233. Giannelli, supra note 1, at 1246, 1247; Note, supra note 139, at 785-86 & nn.84­
88. 
234. See Vitello, 376 Mass. at 443 n.17, 381 N.E.2d at 592 n.17 (citing MCCORMICK, 
EVIDENCE § 203, at 491 (2d ed. 1972»; Note, supra note 139, at 785. 
235. FED. R. EVID. 702. 
236. Note, supra note 139, at 782; see supra note 170 and accompanying text. 
237. See United States v. Fosher, 590 F.2d 381, 382 (lst Cir. 1979). 
238. Note, supra note 139, at 785. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Neal, 392 Mass. at 13 
n.20 , 464 N.E.2d at 1368-69 n.20. 
239. Giannelli, supra note 1, at 1211-12. 
240. Id. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Fatalo, 346 Mass. at 266,269, 191 N.E.2d 479, 
481 (1963) ("judicial acceptance of a scientific theory or instrument can occur only when it 
follows a general acceptance by the community of scientists involved." (emphasis added». 
241. Strong, supra note 123, at 3. 
242. Id. at 6. 
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date a technique purportedly based thereon,243 the offeror must then 
go on to prove acceptance of the technique as a separate issue. 
There is, however, a possible exception to this scenario which is 
of particular relevance to thermographic evidence. Where novel scien­
tific evidence involves the application of a new theory, rather than a 
novel application of an established proposition, the theory can only be 
validated empirically, not deductively.244 The successful application of 
the theory (i.e., the technique) proves the validity of the theory, rather 
than the application being deduced from a valid theory. 
In terms of the Frye test, if the technique is generally accepted, then 
the theory must be valid although not fully understood or explaina­
ble. Thus, proponents of voiceprints [spectrograms] have argued 
that even though the "why" and "how" of the technique are not 
fully understood, the technique works and that alone is sufficient 
validation. Similarly, one commentator has argued: "[T]here does 
not appear to be general acceptance of a theory to explain all the 
phenomenon of aspirin. But even though aspirin's theoretical un­
derpinnings may never be elucidated to the satisfaction of the scien­
tific community, the fact is that it works."245 
Where a technique is developed empirically, its foundation is to show 
that in each instance where the technique was applied, consistent re­
sults were obtained. The validity of the underlying theory is inferred 
from the consistency of the results derived from the technique.246 Em­
pirical validation has been recognized as a method of establishing the 
reliablility and admissibility of certain techniques, including finger­
printing and firearms identification as well as spectrography.247 
The Supreme Judicial Court concluded that spectrographic evi­
dence was admissible under Frye on the basis of an extensive series of 
voice identification experiments.248 The experiments established that 
the technique had a "negligible" rate of error (i.e., that results were 
consistent and the technique reliable).249 The court was then prepared 
to acknowledge that the technique was generally accepted, although 
243. See, e.g., Giannelli, supra note I, at 1212. 
244. [d. 
245. [d. (citing Boren, Voiceprint - Staging a Comeback, 3 U. SAN. FERN. U. L. REV. 
1,9(1974». 
246. [d. at 1212 & n.104. 
247. [d. at 12\3. See also 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 5169, at 95 (1978) ("It would be rational to rely upon a scientific device to 
determine deception if experiments proved that it worked, even though there was dispute 
about why it worked."). 
248. Commonwealth v. Lykus, 367 Mass. 191,200-01,327 N.E.2d 671, 676 (1975). 
249. [d. at 200-01, 327 N.E.2d at 676-77. 
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there was some evidence to the contrary.250 The validity of the under­
lying theory was not otherwise explored. 
This may provide a guideline as to what the proponent of thermo­
graphic evidence must show to prove general acceptance, since ther­
mography, like spectrography, is a technique whose underlying 
principles are not clearly established,251 but whose reliability, argua­
bly, has been empirically validated.252 The litigant would therefore be 
justified in showing the acceptance and reliability of the technique of 
thermography, without delving into theoretical explanations of the 
mechanisms causing abnormalities to be reflected in asymmetrical sur­
face heat emissions, an area in which there is disagreement even 
among those who accept the technique.253 The litigant should be pre­
pared to offer testimony on the way in which the thermographic appa­
ratus functions,254 how surface temperature affects the thermographic 
display,255 and on the correlation between thermographic results and 
those of the diagnostic procedures of electromyography, myelography, 
and clinical diagnosis,256 all of which are accepted as objective means 
of verifying physical pain and dysfunction. Such an offer of proof 
should be sufficient to show that the technique has been empirically 
validated, and adequately defines the area that must be "generally 
accepted. "257 
F. Identifying the Relevant Field 
Defining the community that must accept a scientific principle or 
technique can be difficult for purposes of the Frye standard, particu­
larly when the thing is not indigenous to anyone clearly defined field. 
Much of the evidence excluded under Frye was not readily identifiable 
with anyone scientific discipline.258 Medical thermography has been 
developed, tested, and used by practitioners in a number of areas.259 
The potential problems presented by this situation are somewhat alle­
250. Id. at 204 n.6, 327 N.E.2d at 676-77. 
251. See supra, notes 51-61 and accompanying text. 
252. See supra, notes 87-101 and accompanying text. 
253. See supra, notes 51-60 and accompanying text. 
254. See supra, notes 20-39, 62-68 and accompanying text. 
255. See supra, notes 21-22, 32-33 and accompanying text. 
256. See supra, notes 88-101 and accompanying text. 
257. See Commonwealth v. Lykus, 367 Mass. 191, 196-97,200-01,327 N.E.2d 671, 
674, 676-77 (1975) (showing "the nature of the scientific machine involved" and the relia­
bility of the technique). 
258. Strong, supra note 123, at 12. See also Giannelli, supra note 1, at 1208-09. 
259. These areas include human medicine, physiology, physical medicine and reha­
bilitation, chiropractic, neurosurgery, biomechanics, radiology, and orthopedics. REIN, 
supra note 2, at 2·1 to 2-3; Fay v. Mincey, 454 So. 2d 587, 592 (Fla. App. 1984). 
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viated for the Massachusetts litigant by the definition of the appropri­
ate field as developed in Commonwealth v. Lykus.260 The Lykus 
formulation calls for general acceptance of the technique "by those 
who would be expected to be familiar with its use" (emphasis ad­
ded).261 At the voir dire hearing on the admissibility of spectrographic 
voice identification evidence, the prosecutor in Lykus presented the 
testimony of an academic scientist and researcher in speech science, 
and also of a state trooper affiliated with a state forensic laboratory's 
voice identification unit. 262 The scientist testified that the technique's 
reliability had been established empirically,263 while the trooper, who 
had made the identification ultimately offered in the case,264 was able 
to testify to the procedures used and the qualifications of the examin­
ers.265 Voir dire evidence also showed that opponents of the technique 
had only "theoretical" knowledge of its use, and were without "empir­
ical experience. "266 
With Lykus as a model, the litigant should attempt to define the 
relevant community as those with training and experience in the prac­
tice of medical thermography. This group will include chiroprac­
tors,267 but will not exclude practitioners in other fields whose 
knowledge and experience can qualify them as experts on the more 
technical aspects of the apparatus used and the empirical validation of 
the technique,268 areas that the trial judge will probably explore at the 
voir dire. 
260. 367 Mass. 191, 327 N.E.2d 671 (1975), discussed supra notes 214-18 and ac­
companying text. 
261. Id. at 203, 327 N.E.2d at 677. (emphasis omitted) (quoting People v. Williams, 
164 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 858, 861-62, 331 P.2d 251, 254 (1958)). 
262. Id. at 195, 327 N.E.2d at 673. 
263. Id. at 200-01, 327 N.E.2d at 676-77. 
264. Id. at 195, 327 N.E.2d at 673. 
265. Id. at 201-02, 327 N.E.2d at 677. 
266. Id. at 200, 204-05 n.6, 327 N.E.2d at 676, 678-79 n.6. 
267. Thermography is taught at the National College of Chiropractics and is rou­
tinely used by chiropractors. Fay v. Mincey, 454 So. 2d 587, 592 (Fla. App. 1984). 
268. Chiropractors will probably be considered unqualified to testify in these areas 
while the technique is still unfamiliar to courts. Note that thermography is taught as an 
elective and/or continuing education course at a number of medical schools, including 
Johns Hopkins, Georgetown, George Washington University, University of Oklahoma, 
State University of New York, Albert Einstein, and Veterans Administration hospitals, and 
through the American Thermographic Association, the International Thermographic Soci­
ety, and the National Board of Thermography. Fay v. Mincey, 454 So. 2d 587, 592 (Fla. 
App. 1984), Procida v. McLaughlin, 195 N.J. Super. 396,403,479 A.2d 447, 451 (1984). 
The practitioners whose studies validating medical thermography are cited supra notes 1­
101, Edeiken, Pochaczevsky, and Wexler, inter alia, are medical doctors. The Lykus for­
mulation should allow the inclusion of such experts within the relevant scientific commu­
nity without requiring that all members of the medical professions accept thermography. 
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G. What Constitutes General Acceptance? 
No actual number of those in the field who must accept a tech­
nique in order for it to be considered generally accepted has ever been 
established.269 Massachusetts has set a liberal, if vague, standard; the 
Supreme Judicial Court noted that Fatalo and Frye do not require 
"unanimity of view, only general acceptance; a degree of scientific di­
vergence of view is inevitable."270 Other cases speak of "substantial 
authority"271 and "a con census of expert opinion which the court can 
accept as creating a valid basis for expert testimony."272 Thus the 
court has reiterated its basic concern with the reliability of novel scien­
tific evidence and with the Frye standard as a safeguard on that con­
cern, rather than with numbers per se.273 
H. Establishing General Acceptance 
The general acceptance of a scientific technique can be shown in 
three ways. Typically, acceptance is demonstrated through expert tes­
timony. Technical literature and legal precedent, however, can also be 
useful in establishing reliability and acceptance. Particular problems 
likely to be encountered in introducing novel scientific techniques via 
these methods are discussed below. 
1. Expert testimony. The offeror of thermographic or other 
novel scientific evidence should be prepared to demonstrate accept­
ance and reliability through the testimony of more than one expert.274 
In two cases holding thermographic evidence admissible,275 the propo­
nents offered at least two experts, one qualified to testify to the accept­
ance of thermographic principles and overall reliability of the 
technique, while the second was the medical practitioner who had per­
269. Giannelli, supra note I, at 1210-11; Strong, supra note 123, at II. 
270. Lykus, 367 Mass. at 204 n.6, 327 N.E.2d at 678 n.6. 
271. Commonwealth v. Fatalo, 346 Mass. 266, 269, 191 N.E.2d 479, 481 (1963). 
272. Vitello, 376 Mass. at 441,381 N.E.2d at 591 (quoting W. LEACH & P. LIACOS, 
MASSACHUSEITS EVIDENCE 94 (4th ed. 1967». 
273. See id. But cf. Lykus, 367 Mass. at 199-200 n.3, 204-05 n.6, 327 N.E.2d at 676 
n.3, 678-79 n.6 (hint of nose-counting). 
274. Note the use of two experts in Lykus, discusssed supra notes 260-66 and accom­
panying text. See Giannelli, supra note I, at 1215-16; Note, supra note 139, at 785 n.79 
("Even courts that use tests other than Frye have recognized ... that a single expert. . . 
cannot demonstrate reliability."); United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1240 n.21 (3d 
Cir. 1985) ("proponent must make more than a prima facie showing (e.g., the testimony of 
a single qualified expert) that a technique is reliable"). Cf. Neal, 392 Mass. at 18, 464 
N.E.2d at 1367 (opinion of one expert that previously admissible evidence has become 
unreliable does not by itself require exclusion of the evidence). 
275. Fay v. Mincey, 454 So. 2d 587, 593 (Fla. App. 1984); Procida v. McLaughlin, 
195 N.J. Super. 396,403,479 A.2d 447, 451 (1984). 
49 1986] THERMOGRAMS 
formed and interpreted the offered thermograms.276 These experts tes­
tified to the use of thermography as a medical diagnostic tool among 
practitioners, and to its application in the case at hand. 277 
The use of more than one expert is necessary because the operator 
of the equipment may not be considered qualified to testify to infer­
ences based on test results (here, the inference of the reliablity of the 
technique) or to the technology of the apparatus itself.278 Requiring 
more than one expert also appears to be a sop to the idea of proving 
general acceptance, imposing a "corroboration rule" as protection 
against having to assess the position of a scientific community on the 
basis of the opinion of one interested, and possibly biased, witness.279 
Qualifying experts in thermography presents no unique problems. 
Where the litigant seeks to introduce the testimony of a chiropractor, 
he may find a reference to the statute defining the scope of chiropractic 
medicine280 useful. The statute encompasses the use of "the x-ray and 
analytical instruments" in chiropractic examinations.281 A similar 
statute was held not only to bring thermography within the ambit of 
chiropractic and to be a factor in qualifying an otherwise knowledgea­
ble chiropractor to opine on thermographic results,282 but also to con­
stitute statutory approval of thermography in the diagnosis of lower 
back injuries.283 
2. Scientific and legal literature. Courts frequently consider pub­
lications in the field, and legal commentary on scientific techniques 
276. Fay v. Mincey, 454 So. 2d 587, 590-92 (Fla. App. 1984); Procida v. McLaugh­
lin, 195 N.J. Super. 396, 398-400, 479 A.2d 447, 448-50 (1984). The plaintiff in Procida 
also presented a third expert who testified to the design and operation of the apparatus 
used. Procida, 195 N.J. Super. at 398-400, 479 A.2d at 449-50. Cf Crawford v. 
Shivashankar, 474 So. 2d at 876 n.4 (mediocre qualifications of the single expert went to 
"the quality of the proof' and were a factor in finding on appeal that trial judge had not 
abused discretion in excluding testimony on thermograms). See Ferlise v. Eiler, 202 N.J. 
Super. 330, 335-36,495 A.2d 129, 131 (1985), holding the admission of thermo grams to be 
error, where the appeals court complained that the one expert offering testimony had no 
special training in thermography, while the radiologist who had interpreted the thermo­
grams was not called. 
277. Fay v. Mincey, 454 So. 2d 587, 590-92 (Fla. App. 1984); Procida v. McLaugh­
lin, 195 N.J. Super. 396, 398-99,479 A.2d 447, 448-49 (1984). 
278. See People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24,39,549 P.2d 1240, 1250, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144, 
154 (1976). In Kelly, testimony of the forensics expert who helped to establish the admissi­
bility of spectrographic evidence in Lykus was excluded on the same issue because he was 
qualified as a technician and law enforcement officer, not a scientist. Id. at 41, 549 P.2d at 
1251, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 154-55. 
279. Giannelli, supra note I, at 1215-16. 
280. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. 112, § 89 (West 1983). 
281. Id. 
282. Fay v. Mincey, 454 So. 2d 587, 595 (Fla. App. 1984). 
283. Id. at 595 n.12. 
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used to produce evidence, in making a determination on general ac­
ceptance.284 The relevant literature has been regularly used in Massa­
chusetts, both to establish reliability and to indicate the prevailing 
degree of acceptance of a technique.285 
3. Precedent in other jurisdictions. Courts in Massachusetts, as 
elsewhere, have considered decisions from other courts in determining 
the admissibility of evidence under Frye. 286 The Massachusetts court 
seems to take judicial notice of the decisions themselves, considering 
general acceptance by the courts as well as by scientists.287 Since the 
court is willing to recognize expert opinion as reflected in literature 
and judicial decisions, the testimony of experts in other cases should 
also be subject to judicial notice.288 
The litigant proposing to introduce thermographic evidence 
would do well to demonstrate that medical thermography is making 
its way into the courts. Thermography has been admitted or recog­
nized in a number of cases in jurisdictions including California,289 
Idaho,290 Illinois,291 Florida,292 Louisiana,293 Michigan,294 and New 
284. See Giannelli, supra note I, at 1217. See, e.g., Procida v. McLaughlin, 195 N.J. 
Super. 396,400, 479 A.2d 447,451 (1984). 
285. See Lykus, 367 Mass. at 198, 199,327 N.E.2d at 675, 675-76; Commonwealth v. 
Fatalo, 346 Mass. 266, 269, 191 N.E.2d 479, 481 (1983) ("substantial authority" establish­
ing reliability and general acceptance includes "documentation"). 
286. Lykus, 367 Mass. at 198-99, 327 N.E.2d at 675; Vitello, 376 Mass. at 447-50, 
381 N.E.2d at 594-96. 
287. Lykus, 367 Mass. at 198-199,237 N.E.2d at 675; Vitello, 376 Mass. at 447-450, 
381 N.E.2d at 594-96. See Giannelli, supra note 1, at 1218-19, for criticism of this 
approach. 
288. Giannelli, supra note 1, at 1218. The Supreme Judicial Court seems to have 
judicially noticed expert testimony from another jurisdiction in Lykus, 367 Mass. at 199­
200 n.3, 327 N.E.2d at 676 n.3. For examples of potentially useful expert testimony see 
Fay v. Mincey, 454 So. 2d 587, 591-92 (Fla. App. 1984) and Procida v. McLaughlin, 195 
N.J. Super. 396, 398-400,479 A.2d 447, 448-50 (1984). 
289. Mayhugh v. Augusten, No. 287434 (Orange County, Cal. Super. Ct. 1981); 
(cited in REIN, supra note 2, at 39-7 n.4 (Los Angeles County, Cal. Super. Ct. 1979) (cited 
in REIN, supra note 2, at 39-7 n. 4); Streid v. Bowen, NO.. 52318 (Los Angeles County, Cal. 
Super. Ct. 1979) (cited in REIN, supra note 2, at 39-7 n.4.). Kavalosky v. A&P 21st Street 
Liquor Store, No. 247410 (Sacramento Sup. Ct. March 1977) (cited in Goodley, supra note 
42, at 1004). 
290. Cole v. Nelson, Latah Civil Case No. 16096 (D. Idaho filed July 23, 1980), cited 
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Jersey,295 and Rhode Island.296 Thermographic evidence has been ad­
mitted in federal courts in criminal prosecutions.297 Several courts 
have cited the failure to use thermography as some evidence of negli­
gence in medical malpractice cases, indicating that those courts recog­
nize the reliability of the technique.298 
V. CONCLUSION 
Medical thermography is a technique of great potential in per­
sonal injury cases. In certain types of injuries, notably lower back 
damage, whiplash, and nerve root involvement, thermograms may 
provide the only objective evidence of a paincausing condition. More­
over, thermography may support a claim that an alleged injury is psy­
chosomatic or fraudulent. Thermographic evidence is graphic and 
dramatic, and allows a jury to become involved and to "see" an injury 
that would otherwise only be presented verbally. 
The litigant, however, must be prepared to meet an enhanced bur­
den on the issue of admissibility. The Frye general acceptance stan­
dard remains remarkably pervasive in various forms, and may well be 
applied to the question of the admissibility of thermograms or other 
novel scientific evidence. Academic arguments as to the propriety and 
efficiency of the standard, while intriguing, are of limited use to the 
practitioner who seeks to introduce thermograms at trial in a jurisdic­
tion where the court must, or probably will, apply Frye. Careful anal­
ysis of the issues that the general acceptance standard presents should 
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enable the litigant to prepare to convince the court that thermography 
is sufficiently reliable to justify its admission. 
